

# COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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LONDON, SATURDAY, JULY 28, 1804.

PRICE 10D

I cannot help observing, that, if we persevere in this system of defensive force, and deprive ourselves of the means of striking a preventive blow, we are inviting the enemy to our own shores, attracting the war to the very heart of the empire, and thereby, either hastening our subjugation or rendering the war interminable.—MR. ELLIOT'S SPEECH ON THE ARMY OF RESERVE BILL, JUNE 23, 1803.

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TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM Pitt,  
CHANCELLOR OF HIS MAJESTY'S EXCHE-  
QUER, &c. &c.

SIR,—When I shall have the honour (an honour I have long promised myself) of addressing to you a series of observations on several subjects connected with the great public station which you fill, and by the measures emanating from which we are all so materially affected, it may be found necessary to trouble you, with respect to general motives and objects, with some preliminary statement, a trespass upon your time, for which, when my purpose is to beseech your attention to a single point of finance, I should find myself utterly at a loss to frame an apology.—The point to which I allude, Sir, has presented itself to me in the Resolutions, which, upon your motion, were adopted by the House of Commons, on the 24th instant. Nearly the whole of those resolutions afford matter for comment; but, for the present, I shall confine myself to the 13th; that which exhibits a statement of the produce of the permanent taxes in the several years since January 1793, and which is expressed in the following terms:—“That the nett produce of the permanent taxes existing previous to January 1793, was, in the year ended

“on 5 January 1793 £14,284,000;  
“on 5 January 1794 - 13,941,000;  
“on 5 January 1795 - 13,858,000;  
“on 5 January 1796 - 13,557,000;  
“on 5 January 1797 - 14,292,000;  
“on 5 January 1798 - 13,332,000;  
“on 5 January 1799 - 14,275,000;  
“on 5 January 1800 - 15,743,109;  
“on 5 January 1801 - 14,194,539;  
“on 5 January 1802 - 14,497,226;  
“on 5 January 1803 - 15,425,000;

and on 5 January 1804 - 14,901,000: which last sum exceeds the nett produce of the permanent taxes on the 5th of January 1793, by 617,000L and exclusive of a large increase of arrears outstanding.”—Now, Sir, what inference is it intended that we should draw from this statement? Obviously this: that, notwithstanding the weight of debt and taxes that has accumulated since the year 1792, the taxes which were in existence at that time, and which have continued in existence to this day, still produce as much, nay more, than they produced then. But, is this inference correct? I am convinced it is not; and shall state to you the reasons whence that conviction has arisen.—When you say, that the produce of the year ending 5th Jan. 1804, that is to say, the year 1803, “exceeds the produce of the year ending 5th Jan. 1793,” that is to say the year 1792, you may mean, that the produce of the former exceeds that of the latter in more nominal amount; and to that proposition I have nothing to object. But, if such were your meaning, it should have been explained; for, certain I am, that of the ten thousand persons, who will probably read this letter, not one will be found, who would not, from the Resolution above quoted, have concluded, that the taxes there spoken of produced more in worth in 1803 than they did in 1792. Indeed, such a conclusion is the object evidently aimed at by the statement; and, to show that it is a very erroneous conclusion will, I am persuaded, require but very little pains.—Were any one to state to us, that the value of money has not depreciated during the last eleven years, we should instantly contradict him. I am not here speaking of the depreciation of the paper currency; I am not speaking of the state of public credit; I wish, on this occasion, to keep clear of any question relating to the cause or causes of the depreciation of money, being desirous merely to establish the fact. But, can any thing be wanting from me for this purpose? Is it not a fact already completely established? Has not money, exclusive of the effect of recent most powerfully accelerating causes, been gradually depreciating for centuries? Have not all the writers on finance, when comparing the amount of the revenue in different years, taken care to make allowance for the gradual and constant depreciation of money? Has not Mr. Wheatley in

his admirable treatise, published last year, stated, that, even upon the principle of Sir George Schuckburgh's calculations, the revenue of 1790, amounting to 15,500,000l. was equal to 17,500,000l. of the revenue of 1800? And, will it then be pretended, that a pound sterling of the revenue of 1803 is equal in value to a pound sterling of the revenue of 1792? Yet, as I before observed, this is the conclusion which is evidently intended to be drawn from the statement that I have quoted from the financial Resolutions.—Enough has been said, and, indeed, much more than enough, as to the principle and the fact of depreciation: it remains only to fix correctly the *degree*, in order to show the amount of the *defalcation*, instead of the increase, which has taken place in the produce of the old permanent taxes. The price of bread has been said to be a standard frequently very incorrect; and it may be so. But, we well know, indeed Parliament has most solemnly declared, that bread is now *too cheap*; if, therefore, I take the average price of bread from this time back as far as the month of January, 1802, embracing a period in which came to market three of the most abundant harvests that England ever knew; and, if I compare this average price with that of a like space of time previous to the month of January, 1793, I am certain that no one will accuse me of a want of fairness. I have sought these averages; and, I find that of the last mentioned period to be 6d.  $\frac{1}{4}$  for the quatern loaf, while that of the first mentioned period is 9d.  $\frac{3}{4}$ . It follows, of course, that money has, in this country (no matter from what cause) depreciated in value in the amount of *one third*, since the year 1792. I am sure, Sir, that you will not deny this conclusion; but, lest other persons should, I think it necessary to call to my aid authorities, against whom I am certain they will not think of contending: I mean, Mr. Rose and yourself. Mr. Rose, in his "Considerations on the Debt of the Civil List," published in 1802, after the scarcity was over, says: "in the Lord Steward's department, the prices of many kinds of provisions are more than double, and, on the whole, at least 70 per centum *bigrer* than in 1786." As to yourself, Sir, you stated to the House of Commons, in the debate upon the civil list, no longer ago than the 2d instant, that the advance in prices since the year 1786 was at least 60 per centum, "and of this fact," said you, "every gentleman must be perfectly satisfied." Your estimate is below that of Mr. Rose, but I will take it as my rule of proportion, because it was made

at the very time when the Parliament had just declared corn to be too cheap. If, then, Sir, prices have risen, or money has fallen (for they are only different words to express the same thing), 60 per centum since 1786, it must have fallen 37 per centum since 1792, that is, more than *one-third*, and this, if your statement upon the civil list was correct, fully corroborates and establishes the conclusion drawn from the comparative prices of the quatern loaf.—Thus, then, Sir, the degree of depreciation is *one-third at least*; whence it follows, of course, that as there is very little difference in the nominal amount of the old taxes of 1792 and that of the same taxes in 1803, the defalcation in the *real* amount has been as 1 to 3; and, that, the produce of those taxes in 1803, to make it *equal* to their produce in 1792, should have amounted to about 19,500,000l. instead of 14,900,000l.—I am, Sir, &c. &c. &c. Wm. COBBETT.

#### SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

**REVIEW OF THE MEASURES RELATING TO THE ARMY.**—How or when is this war to be brought to an end? When are our fatigues and expenses to be diminished? When shall we be relieved from the ever-returning alarms and terrors of invasion? When, oh when! shall we get rid of our dangers and our disgrace? — Such are the questions which every thinking man puts to his neighbour, or, at least to himself; and, though to give a satisfactory answer might be difficult; though to say what may or can be done is, perhaps, impossible; yet, it is easy to perceive, as to one point, what cannot be done; it is easy to perceive, that, with a species of force, whose operations are by law confined within the kingdom, no preventive blow can be struck, no diversion can be made, no dread of our power can exist in the mind of the enemy. That enemy, as far as he is disposed to act upon the Continent, may safely consider Great Britain as not having a single soldier at her command. He is in a situation to harass us by his threats; to keep us in almost constant alarm, and to swell our expenses far beyond those of former wars, while his own people live in perfect tranquillity, making a jest of our fears, and while he expends out of his own treasury very little, if any, more than he would expend, were he not at war. In his commerce and his colonies, that part of his resources and dominion upon which he appears to set no value, he has suffered all the loss that we can make him suffer. His internal authority we have not been able to shake by intrigue: a low and bungling ad-

tempt at it has only tended to accelerate the consummation of his glory: and the nations of Europe seem to vie with each other for the precedence in bowing down before him. In short, so great does he appear, so powerful do we feel him to be when compared with us, that the comfort of many really seems to arise from the hope, that we shall remain unconquered, because he will regard us as being beneath his notice! Base as this hope is, however, it is not more base than fallacious; for, though he shou'd esteem us a degraded people, he knows that we inhabit a rich and fertile country; and he also knows, that the more degraded men are, the more likely they are to make excellent slaves.— To rescue us from this state of intolerable disgrace would require great and wise measures in all the departments of government; but more particularly in that, to which is committed the care of providing an efficient military force, of which force we are, at this moment, most shamefully and alarmingly destitute. Many and loud have been the complaints and remonstrances, which, on different occasions, have, through the pages of the Register, been made upon this subject. But, repetition, though very irksome to the writer, and still more so to the reader, is, unfortunately, necessary, in order to obtain even a chance of producing the desired effect. All exertion may be useless, but one must be quite certain of the inutility before it can be pleaded in justification of failing to persevere. The present moment is, too, rather favourable than otherwise: Parliament is about to adjourn after having passed several laws upon the subject of our military defence: every scheme that ministers have thought proper to adopt has now been tried, and is under trial: this, therefore, seems to be precisely the time to take a review of the measures relating to the army, and to exhibit to the public that train of errors, which have deprived us of an efficient military force, and which, until they are corrected, will continue that deprivation.— This exposition must begin with a statement of the troops discharged or disbanded at the conclusion of the peace of Amiens; that peace, which, as Mr. Pitt observed, the ministers who made it regarded as "the notice of a new war;" that peace whoever believed in the duration which was set down as "the fool of nature;" that peace which, in the words of Majesty's declaration, had been, on the part of the enemy, "one continued series of hostility." At the conclusion of such a peace, one would think that ministers ought to have been slow in disbanding the forces of the country: as it was "a peace of

"experiment," one would think they should have tried the experiment before they threw aside the implements of war; especially when it is well known, that, even between the definitive and the preliminary treaty, the enemy with whom we were negotiating was making conquests more rapidly than he had made them in war, and that, while Lord Cornwallis was at Amiens higgling for the cession of Ceylon and Trinidad, Buonaparté was at Lyons receiving the oaths of allegiance from the greater and the better part of Italy, having already added the important island of Elba to the territory of France. Under such circumstances it might reasonably have been expected to see ministers proceed with great caution in disbanding the army; yet, according to their own acknowledgments, made by the mouth of Mr. Secretary Yorke, they instantly reduced the army, including militia and fencibles, from 250,000 to 126,000 men, of which 126,000, it would, probably, be difficult for them to prove the existence at this day. Mr. Yorke's speech has been quoted before; but, on this occasion, it is necessary again to refer to it. He stated, that 71,000 militia had been disembodied, because it was the custom to disband the militia at the conclusion of peace. To have rendered this reason valid, it should have been shown, that it was also customary to make a peace of experiment, a peace being merely the notice of a new war. Upon the same principle 20,679 men of the fencible regiments were immediately disbanded. Invalids to the amount of, 5,172 men were reduced, in order, he told the House, to form them into a more effective corps; but they were not so formed; no step was taken towards such formation; the men were scattered all over the kingdom, and were not, till the signal of war was given, called together again, to their very great inconvenience and injury, which must also have made a considerable reduction in their numbers. There were 7,025 men discharged, of whom no description was given; but allowing them to have been entitled to their discharge, we still find 19,438 men belonging to the cavalry and to foreign corps, who neither were entitled to their discharge nor wished to have it. The militia and fencibles might, and should, have been kept embodied for several months, at least, after the conclusion of a peace which was nothing but the notice of a new war; but, upon this description of force one is not inclined to lay much stress; it is the disbanding of the cavalry and the foreign corps that we have to regret, and that we have to pay for too. Mr. Yorke's statement of the reasons for this

measure is curious and interesting in the extreme. "The cavalry," said he, "amounted to 25,000 men; a force not thought necessary, and, for that reason, as well as because it was the most expensive sort of force, the reduction commenced with it; and, 10,493 men of that description were reduced." Observe that this force was not thought necessary by the ministers who regarded the peace merely as the notice of a new war; and then observe, that, when the new war took place, in about eight or nine months after the reduction of the cavalry was made, one of the first of the military measures of these same ministers, was, *to augment the cavalry* in nearly the same proportion, as far as their ability to raise men would go, that this very cavalry had been reduced! Either the ministers are now guilty of great insincerity in pretending that they did not expect the peace to last, or it becomes them to show that they were innocent of a much more serious offence in making so large a reduction of the cavalry. "The expense!" This was the most expensive sort of force. True; but, allowing that the peace was expected to last, this sort of force might have been kept up, at least, till the experiment of peace had been tried, at an expense very little greater than that attending the support of an equal number of infantry. The horses might have been sold, and the dismounted men quartered in barracks, or elsewhere, in the same manner as if they had been infantry. The wisdom of keeping them dismounted for years may admit of dispute; but for a year or eighteen months, with an intimation that they should either be discharged, or mounted again, at the expiration of that time, they might very conveniently have been retained. And who does not lament; who that reflects upon the expense and trouble which we have had to get men into the regular army through the army of reserve; who that has observed the torment and miseries of the ballot and of all the various means and measures which have occupied the nation for this year past; what man that looks at the state of our military force at this moment, does not sorely lament that we have not now these 10,493 regular disciplined soldiers, especially when he is informed, that this number is nearly equal to all the effective recruits that have been raised for the regular army since the commencement of the war, notwithstanding measures so extraordinary have been resorted to for that purpose? "The foreign corps," says Mr. Yorke, "to the number of 8,945 men, were reduced, because this was a force which we were glad to spare, and

" which, when a reduction was necessary, we thought it most politic to reduce; for, when British troops were disbanded, who would think of retaining foreigners?" Nobody: but, because it is allowed, that, when British troops are disbanded, it would not be advisable to retain foreign troops; and because it is also allowed, that, when a reduction is necessary, it should begin with foreigners next after the men whose term of service has expired; because this is allowed it does not for that reason follow, that the disbanding of the foreign corps, in the present instance, was either politic or justifiable; for the necessity of the reduction of the British troops is denied; it was denied at the time; the ministers were exhorted not to disband any of the regular army, but rather to augment it; and, if we yet wanted any thing to convince us of the folly of their measures in this respect, the act of parliament which has just been past for raising foreign corps might, one would think, be quite sufficient for the purpose. The expense of raising a number of foreigners equal to the number disbanded, including contingencies, cannot fall much short of thirty pounds a man, making, in the whole, 268,350l. This is a decent little sum which the nation has to pay by way of smart-money for having fallen in love with a ministry of well-meaning men, taken, according to the advice of Mr. Wilberforce, from amongst "the middling classes of society, and of whom, by the bye, more than one half of the present cabinet, or, of the "noses," at least, of the present cabinet, consists. But, the pecuniary loss, considerable as it is in itself, sinks out of sight when compared with the national injury which has arisen from the want of an efficient army; of which army the corps here spoken of would, in a war like the present, have formed a most valuable part. How long it will require to raise foreign troops in number equal to those disbanded there is at hand no means of ascertaining; nor, indeed, would it be easy to guess at the number likely to be raised in the whole; but, it must be evident to every one, that if we had already collected another 8,945 foreigners together in regiments, it would take a long while to render them equal in point of discipline to those whom our ministers disbanded. And, as to the effect of these new foreign corps upon the mind of the enemy, very different indeed will it be from that which was, and which must have continued to be, produced by the existence of the old foreign corps, which chiefly consisted of exactly that description of men of whose exertions the enemy had

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most reason to be afraid.—The cavalry and the foreign troops together amounted to 19,438 men, to replace whom, at the rate of 30*l.* a man, which is a very low calculation, if we consider the price which has been paid for substitutes in the army of reserve, will stand the nation in 583,140*l.* more than half a million of money, as a little beginning of the expenses of the peace of Amiens; that peace which, according to Mr. Addington, was to produce a *saving* of 25,000,000*l.* a year! Those who objected to the peace stated, as the foundation of their objection, that such a peace would not permit the nation to disarm with safety; and, that, therefore, either the safety of the nation must be hazarded, or we must continue to support all the expenses, unaccompanied with any one of the advantages of war. There were others who approved of the peace, because they thought, from the then declarations of ministers, that we might safely reduce our establishments, and, of course, our expenses. This was, on both sides, matter of opinion. The former description of persons were consistent in exhorting the ministers not to disband the army and dismantle the fleet; the latter were equally consistent in calling upon them to disarm, and thereby to reduce the amount of our expenses. But, what shall be said for Mr. Addington and his colleagues, the greater part of whom are now the colleagues of Mr. Pitt? They who were in possession of all the proofs of the enemy's hostility; they who disbanded the army and dismantled the fleet while they regarded the peace as merely the notice of a new war, and who have since advised their Sovereign to make a solemn declaration to the world, that the whole interval of peace was occupied, on the part of the enemy, by a series of aggressions and insults? It would be curious to see, by and bye, an accurate enumeration of all the *expenses*, instead of the *savings* of the peace of Amiens: such a calculation might furnish the money-loving people of this country with a pretty satisfactory proof of the truth which Mr. Windham endeavoured to impress upon their minds: that true economy consisted in judiciously applying the resources of the nation to the means of preserving its honour, its power, and its consequence in the world. He endeavoured in vain: the cry of, "capital, credit and confidence," within doors, and that of "peace and plenty," without, stifled the sound of his voice. Had not the country been stripped of its army and its fleet; had they been kept in tolerable trim for a year, not only the expenses of recruiting to fill the place of men discharged, and most of the

other extraordinary expenses that have arisen out of this war, might have been avoided: but who shall say that we might not have avoided the war itself, at least for another year or two? There is, indeed, little reason to suppose, that we could have rested long in peace without effecting some alteration in the then state of things; but, if any thing could have afforded us a chance of a duration of peace and of living in safety at the same time, it would have been the keeping our army, our regular army, up to its full establishment, making thereto a little augmentation, which augmentation might, at a trifling expense, have been made out of the flower of the militia. And, if, thus prepared, we had failed in our efforts to preserve peace and our honour, will any one say, that the war would have commenced under such disadvantages as it did commence? The knowledge that you have an army always has its weight with your enemy. If Buonaparté had seen us capable of sending twenty or thirty thousand men up the Elbe, he would have hesitated before he dispatched his army to take possession of Hanover; and, if he had finally resolved on the enterprize, that army might have been met by the Hanoverian army, aided by ten or fifteen thousand men from Great Britain, who might have been reinforced as occasion required. Instead of this, Great Britain, destitute of an army, could think of nothing but providing for her own defence; and so unwise and completely inefficient have the measures of ministers been, that her capability to ensure even that object yet appears doubtful.—Having reduced the regular army at home to one half of the amount of its strength during the late war, when the new war came upon us there was no time to raise any thing but militia and other troops for home service only: at least, want of time was pleaded for this defensive military system. But, previous to the war, great pains had been taken to augment the establishment of the Scotch militia, or at least to provide for its augmentation in case of war. When the bill for this purpose was before the House of Commons, the evil tendency of it was pointed out: the ministers were told, that the establishment was too large, that it would destroy the recruiting service for the regular army in that most fertile field for recruits; and, Mr. Elliot particularly dwelt upon the mischiefs which would, in this respect, be experienced from the measure at the breaking out of a new war. The ministers persevered: the establishment was extended: the consequences have been just such as were foretold: Scotland, which used

to afford recruits by thousands, has, during this war, sent forth only her hundreds. The numbers of the English militia were fixed equally high in proportion. A new code, occupying a hundred pages of the Statute Book, was enacted with a view of correcting all the errors and incongruities which had crept into the system during the war. At the head of these stood the officering of the militia by persons unqualified in point of property; but, the moment the war began; nay, before it actually began, a bill was introduced, by the very same person who had drawn up and brought forward the new code, for officering the militia by persons not qualified agreeably to that code. Having thus obtained laws for shutting up 73,000 men in the home service of Great Britain, it was time to think about Ireland, where the bounty for the regular army being 5 guineas, it was thought necessary, lest men should run too fast into that service and thereby rob the precious militia, to offer, and to give too, 4 guineas as a bounty for militiamen! Thus was the regular army in Ireland put upon a fair footing with that in Great Britain; that is to say, cut off from the possibility of obtaining a recruit. For the Irish must be even greater brutes than some persons appear to think them, if they did not perceive, that there was more than a guinea difference between service for five years or during the war and service for life, especially when, in the former, they could not be compelled to quit Ireland, while, in the latter, they might be sent to any part of the world. Ireland could afford, and did immediately afford 18,000 men. So that we had, by the month of May, 1803, past laws the great purpose of which appeared to be to prevent 91,000 of the ablest bodied men in the kingdom from being liable to quit it, on any account whatever. This being happily accomplished, the ministers seemed disposed to look about them, as it were to see if the enemy was coming; but, by this time Mr. Pitt had determined to come forth from his retirement, and that he came with a project will be remembered in this country till the Army of Reserve shall be forgotten, which will not be very soon. When that measure, of which he was the real author, was proposed to the Parliament, he, of course stood forth its champion; but of this there will be an occasion to speak hereafter. The army of reserve was decreed; but, as if its inventors had been afraid that the amendments which had been introduced into the plan at the instance of Mr. Windham, and without which it would have proved almost entirely abortive; as if they had been jealous of the

success of their own plan thus amended, they set up a system of volunteering, which so widely extended the exemptions from the ballot of the army of reserve, that more than about two thirds of the numbers to be raised have not been raised, and the law has, in that degree, been as useless as one of the chapters of Sir Francis D'Ivernois's books. It could not be enforced farther. There were no more materials for it to work upon; and it would absolutely have died for want of food, if Mr. Pitt, its father and its guardian, had not come to its assistance. Mr. Addington and his colleagues had, at last, discovered, that there were not, even with the aid of the army of reserve, any men left to go into the regular army; and, as all the other bodies were full, as we had raised 91,000 militia men, 25,000 sea fencibles, and 400,000 volunteers; as we had locked up more than half a million of men fit to bear arms, it was high time to look about us for the rest to make real soldiers of them; for, amidst all our vaunting about "the irresistible phalanxes of citizens armed in defence of their property, their families, and all that is dear to man," we still felt a little monitor in our bosom, who taught us to pray to God that our liberties and lives might, in the hour of danger, not be left entirely to the prowess and discipline of those phalanxes. In short, we all of us, ministers and all, began to see the necessity of providing a force sufficient to defend ourselves and our phalanxes into the bargain. Thus impressed the ministers proposed to suspend the operation of the army of reserve law, and once more to have recourse to the raising of men for rank, for which purpose several agreements were entered into, which agreements will probably never be fulfilled for want of the men sufficient to establish the claim to the proposed rank. Mr. Pitt, seeing his army of reserve project, which, though a good deal disfigured, he still recognized as his own, about to be annihilated, rushed forward to protect and preserve it, with all the courage and anxiety of a father who sees a darling child upon the point of perishing under the hands of an ignorant or merciless operator. Numerous as is the progeny of projects that call this gentleman father, some persons are astonished at his ardour for the army of reserve, upon which his whole undivided affection seems to have been fixed. But those persons have not observed, that this affection is rather of an instinctive nature than otherwise; that it abandons its objects one after another as the lioness leaves her whelps, retaining very little apparent remembrance of any but the last. It is

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the present object: the object of "existing circumstances :" *le projet du jour*: this it is that you ever find occupying the mind and soul of Mr. Pitt. When, therefore, he perceived the design of the late ministry to put an end to the army of reserve project, he resolved to assault them. He was told that it could live no longer; that it must die for want of food; that the ballot would produce no more men in spite of the most active exertions of the parish officers and thief-takers from one end of the kingdom to the other. This was sad intelligence; and, as there seemed to be no doubt of the fact, any man but him of whom we are speaking would have resigned himself to what was evidently the will of fate. Not so Mr. Pitt, who, as his favourite project was perishing for want of sustenance determined to procure that sustenance, cost what it would. There were no more men. Seventy or eighty thousand had, in Great Britain alone, been swallowed up by the militia. He resolved at once to make the militia disgorge; or, at least, cut off its rations for the future; not to put it on a diminished allowance, but to pass on it a sentence of starvation. Here we have a striking instance of his instinctive attachment. The militia had been a favourite; he had swelled it to three times the numbers that it contained when it first came into his hands; but, in comparison with the *projet du jour*, the militia itself, the caressed, the flattered, the eulogized militia, becomes a mere worthless outcast. When the army of reserve project was first broached, the supplementary militia was not raised. It was deemed. It had a nominal existence; but, as yet it was not raised, nor, indeed, hardly begun to be raised, when the army of reserve bill made its appearance. Mr. Elliot and Mr. Windham earnestly endeavoured to prevail upon the ministers either to abandon this new project, or to put a stop to the raising of the supplementary militia; for, that to raise both was utterly impossible, without excluding all hope of obtaining for the regular army even recruits enough to fill up the vacancies made by deaths, discharges, and desertions. "In addition," said Mr. Windham, "to 73,000 men, raising by ballot upon the population of Great Britain, and of 18,000 so raised in Ireland, we are now to have 10,000 more for Ireland and 40,000 for Great Britain, making in the whole the number of 141,000, of which 18,000 (the original militia in Ireland), are to be raised by bounty in the first instance, and the rest to be raised by ballot, with the privilege of exemption from personal service, on the condition of finding

" a substitute. Does any man dream after this that it is possible for Great Britain to have an army? The hope is utterly childish. The recruiting of the army has, every body knows, long stood still. An army not recruited must, by degrees, waste away. In spite of all the hopes, which some persons may indulge, of transferring men hereafter by new bounties, the army must unavoidably stand still for the present, and, one may venture to say, that, under the influence of such a system, it is not likely to be again put in motion." Has not this opinion been fully verified? And would it not have been well for the country if Mr. Windham's advice had been listened to? Mr. Elliot objected to the measure for reasons similar to those stated by Mr. Windham. He noticed a former declaration of Mr. Pitt, that "even 100,000 men might be raised in Great Britain by ballot, without in the least degree injuring the recruiting service;" upon which he observed, that, if the men who were balloted were also compelled to serve in person, he did not know but they might be raised without materially affecting the regular army; "but," said he, "I aver that even one-fourth part of the number, procured by the exorbitant bounty to which a system of substitution gives rise, would for a time totally extinguish the recruiting service." Mr. Elliot took great pains to press upon the ministers the necessity of suspending the Supplementary Militia, at any rate, it being impossible to raise that force and the army of reserve too. He insisted, that, not only would the regular recruiting for the army be totally extinguished, but that, if the raising of the Supplementary Militia was persevered in, the army of reserve according to the proposed numbers could not be raised in any reasonable time, and, of course, that the regular army would be very late in receiving aid through that channel. The army of reserve has not been raised. It could not be raised. And now, in order to afford a chance of obtaining men under the new bill of Mr. Pitt, the supplementary militia has been obliged to be abandoned. Mr. Addington and Mr. Yorke are consistent. They contended, that the establishment of militia was not too large, and that it did not operate injuriously to the recruiting of the army; but, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Castlereagh, Lord Hawkesbury; the whole of the six famous "Noses" contended for the same point, and how can they, unless they plead their transformation, justify the advice they have now given to his Majesty to

make such an immense reduction in the militia, with a view of enabling the country to afford recruits for the regular army? They insisted, particularly Lord Castlereagh, on whom the task of detail generally fell; they constantly insisted, that their various measures of balloting and volunteering had not tended, and would not tend, to increase the difficulties of raising men for general service. Where is the reader who does not recollect their repeated asseverations to this effect; their dashing statements of the number of men procured per month; and their insinuations as to the motives of those who were so hard-hearted as not to believe above one-half of what they said? Nor were these notions and assertions confined to the Noses: they were adopted by, if they did not proceed from, the very head to which those Noses are now attached, and which compels them to snuffle forth a different language. Mr. Pitt, as is stated in the speech of Mr. Elliot, declared that 100,000 men might be raised by ballot in Great-Britain alone, without any injury to the recruiting service of the regular army. "If said he" (in the debate of June 6, 1803, and in alluding to a speech of Mr. Windham): "If I had to state here my objection, it would not be that the militia was too much: I think that a militia to this extent" (including the supplementary militia, making for Great-Britain 73,000) "we can bear. We know that we have raised 100,000 men by ballot. To the militia may, too, I should think be added another force for home service, or we shall not be in a state of security."\* That he did not mean the men balloted to be compelled to serve in person is evident, and we now know, that, long before Great-Britain had raised one-half of the number of the 73,000 militia men, the recruiting service for the regulars was at a stand. In the debate of the 23d of June, Mr. Pitt followed immediately after Mr. Elliot. He approved of the army of reserve project; and, as he himself observed in the opening of his speech, "it was rather unfortunate that he approved of it for precisely those reasons which Mr. Elliot had stated as the grounds of his objection." He took infinite pains to disfigure rather than to combat the opinions and arguments of Mr. Elliot. "Our first object," said he, "ought to be that of defending ourselves, before we concur in the plans of those honourable gentlemen for inflicting vengeance for the ag-

"gressions and insults we have sustained. "If we are so *romantic* as to say, that the obtaining of a defensive force, which will be sufficient to disappoint the proud expectations of the enemy, is a consideration below our notice; if to insure our safety against an enemy who has conquered, terrified, and oppressed one-half of Europe, be a task too humble for us to stoop to; if it is thought that we had better add to the list of his victims than stop short of any thing less than being enrolled as his conquerors; if gentlemen carried their heroism to that extent, they would certainly be justified in opposing this bill; but, I confess, such are not my sentiments."\* It would have done the reader's heart good to have seen what delight this tirade of stately wit excited in the breasts of the stock-jobbers, who listen to it (I mean from the gallery), and who could scarcely refrain from chuckling out loud. But, to men of common discernment and of any recollection it was evident that the whole tirade was inapplicable; for, when did either Mr. Windham or Mr. Elliot talk of "inflicting vengeance for the aggressions and insults we had sustained?" Never. They never saw any measure likely to enable the country to attempt such an enterprise. Mr. Pitt, indeed, began his speeches in favour of the war by a loud cry for vengeance. One would have thought he had in view an immediate march to Paris. It is useless to refer to his speech, for every one must remember it, where he calls upon the nation to "repress the ambition and chastise the insolence of the foe." Mr. Windham and Mr. Elliot had never thus broken out in untimely gasconade; nor had they I repeat it, in any one instance, expressed sentiments bearing the least resemblance to those imputed to them by Mr. Pitt. When had either of them said, that to provide a force sufficient to secure us against the proud expectations of the enemy was "an object beneath our notice?" When had they given utterance to any idea which could lead their hearers to suppose that they would be content with nothing short of seeing the country "enrolled as the conqueror of the enemy?" They uniformly stated their object to be *security*; but they insisted, that to provide for that security an efficient regular army was necessary, which army they said we could not have if we did not diminish the militia; and now, after an immense useless expense, and a loss of time still

\* Parl. Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1835.

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more important, Mr. Pitt, by his measures, confesses the correctness of their opinions, though he very carefully avoids making any such confession with his tongue. Upon the occasion here spoken of he defended and eulogised the militia system, and maintained, as in his former speech of June 6, that the 73,000 men in that service were not too many for Great-Britain, though the ministers, with his concurrence, and, indeed, at his instigation, were about to add thereto 40,000 balloted men under the name of army of reserve. "I am," said he, "not a little surprised, when I hear it gravely asserted, that the existence of a large militia force" (the very force which he has now found it necessary to reduce in the proportion of one-third) "is incompatible with the existence of a large military force, and destructive to the military spirit of the country. It is admitted even by those gentlemen" (Mr. Elliot and Mr. Windham) "that this is a question of degree; and, if it be admitted, that the militia to the extent of 30,000 men was good in its kind, and if that force was considered as necessary forty years ago, those honourable gentlemen must admit, that a much larger force is wanted now." Not to throw away time in commenting upon this curious logic I shall only beg the reader to remember that this speech was made after both the old and supplementary militia had been ordered to be raised, and at the time when the Parliament was about to pass a law, at the instigation of Mr. Pitt himself, for the purpose of adding 40,000 to the number of the balloted men already raised and intended to be raised. Yet this same gentleman, who was now so sarcastic upon those who feared that the militia was swelled beyond due bounds, comes to the Parliament, in less than a year after, and not only makes a proposition for reducing the militia by one-third part of its strength, but for abolishing the ballot altogether, and his reason is, that, with so large a balloted force, it is impossible to obtain recruits for the regular army; a truth which had been stated to him and to the Parliament a hundred times, and which he had, as often as he heard it uttered, positively denied. It is true, that, for the sake of the *projet du jour*, he seems to have abandoned his errors relative not only to the quantity but to the principle of the militia; but, the people have paid pretty dearly, both in their purses and their persons, for his long adherence to those errors. The expense to the parishes and to individuals has been enormous; and, who can pretend to justify the waste, the

sport, that has been made of the zeal and exertions of the people of all ranks and degrees in providing the supplementary militia? In some cases the supplementary men have been added to the establishment, making but one battalion for the county. Here the mortification and listlessness of the officers and the consequent indiscipline of the men may not be so great; but, where the supplementary men are formed into separate battalions, as is the case with Wiltshire, Surrey, and several other counties, and where those battalions are, by the law recently past, condemned to waste away till they have no longer any men belonging to them; in such cases the indifference of the officers must be so great as to render the corps, in a very little time, perfectly useless. The men of these corps will, doubtless, when they come to be very much reduced in numbers, be drafted into the first battalions of their respective counties. But, are the officers to be dismissed? Those belonging to the regular army may return to half-pay, indeed; but, what an ungrateful return is dismissal, in the midst of war, to those country gentlemen who have come forward in the service of the country? To sacrifice money foolishly is blameable, especially at a time like the present; but to lavish thus, to throw away, the zeal and the spirit of the country, in a species of prodigality which it is hardly possible to condemn in terms of adequate severity. And, what, I would be glad to know, is to be done with the non-commissioned officers belonging to these mouldering corps? They must be kept up. They cannot be reduced merely because it has come athwart the mind of the minister to sentence their corps to a lingering death. They will, towards the last, have very few men to take care of; but, still they cannot, without the most flagrant injustice, be reduced in number, in any other way than by discharging them, a measure which will hardly be thought expedient. They must, then, go with the remains of their men, as supernumeraries, into the first battalions, which they will find already over-stocked. What confusion is here! What wild, what crazy work, projects produce when conceived in the mind of a minister! Providence, in mercy to man, has generally made poverty a check upon projecting. When the latter happens to meet with opulence in a private individual it seldom fails to be productive of considerable mischief; what, then, must be its effect when preponderating, when always uppermost, in the mind of a minister of state, and especially a minister who has thirty millions a year passing through his hands;

a minister of whom one half of the nation are the tenants and the other half the annuitants? An answer to this question will be readily given by any one who has observed the progress of our military measures for the last twelve months, and who contemplates our present situation when compared with the sacrifices and exertions that have been made by the people of every class and description. —The threat of an invasion of this kingdom, on the part of the French, and the expectation of it, on our part, have been in constant existence for more than a year. We have been all that time endeavouring to prepare for an effectual resistance, and for an attack upon the enemy, in case an opportunity should offer. What, then, have we done? What progress have we made in this work, absolutely necessary to our existence? We have not, by all the various means that have been employed; by all the numerous projects that have been, and that yet are on foot; we have not added to our army so many men as were taken from it by the reduction at the conclusion of the peace; we have not since the month of March, 1803, that is to say since the signal of war was given, and the militia was called out, we have not raised nearly 20,000 regular soldiers, which is about the number of cavalry and foreign troops that were disbanded in the year 1802, and some of them but a very few months previous to the time when we found it necessary again to begin the work of augmentation. At the end of fifteen months of military projects, we have in Great Britain about 30,000, I say *thirty thousand*, and no more, effective rank and file of the regular army, exclusive of Guards, Artillery, and Cavalry. From the field-of-battle estimate the Guards ought to be excluded; for, if they are employed there, other regular soldiers should be found to supply their place. Our Artillery are, proportionally, numerous, well appointed, and excellent in every respect; and, unless I am misinformed, great praise is due, in this respect, to Lord Chatham. But artillery, though they frequently begin, and have sometimes greatly contributed towards the deciding of a battle, are, without infantry, and without a due proportion of infantry too, nothing at all. The same may be said of horse. Without infantry there can, against an army of infantry, be no battle at all; and, accordingly, the first care of every general, and of every wise government, is, to provide a sufficiency of troops of this sort, in proportion to the numbers of whom the strength of an army is always computed. Allowing the Guards to form part of the army for the field, and that their

place will be supplied by militia, we have about 40,000 regular infantry in Great Britain, and 20,000 in Ireland, while the recruiting for general service yields not more than 400 or 500 a month, which number, added to the men enlisted for general service out of the army of reserve, may, probably, amount to about 1,200 a month; and this supply, which is to be shared by the regiments in the East and West Indies, the Mediterranean, and all other parts abroad, will not be found more than half sufficient, perhaps, to fill up the vacancies occasioned by death, desertion, and discharges, many of which latter must take place every year, in spite of all regulation, because many men will annually become unfit for service. Let it be recollected, too, that I am stating the force as effective upon paper; and if my readers do not know the difference between a force upon paper and a force in the field, the Emperor Napoleon does. An army which consists of 40,000 of what are called effectives, seldom contains more than 35,000 fighting men. Admitting, however, that we have an army of 40,000 regular soldiers in Great Britain ready to take the field, what is it, when we consider the extent of coast that we have to defend? It must be obvious to every one, that, if they are separated but a little, there will not be a handful in any one place. Next, then, comes the consideration of what degree of reliance can be reasonably placed in the militia. I should hope that, by this time, the militia were in a state of discipline to render them worthy of being relied on for a stout resistance. Still, however, they are not nearly equal to regular soldiers, and this will be denied by no one, who knows any thing of the matter, and who is not under the influence of selfishness or fear. They are not, and they never can be, equal to regular soldiers; and, however we may deceive ourselves with respect to them, we may rest assured, that we shall produce no deception in the mind of the enemy. Of the volunteers, that other "great feature in our national defence," I would fain have said nothing, especially as the national utility of that body, regulated as it now is, has met with so full and able an exposition from the pen of a correspondent in page 128, to which I beg leave to refer the reader; but, a letter just received from Yorkshire contains matter, which it is my duty to make known to the public, and more especially to the minister, who, I trust, will lose no time in taking measures of precaution against the dangers, which, in my opinion, wear a more serious aspect in this quarter than in any other. The reader

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need not be told, that a bill was lately brought into parliament to continue a law which had been passed in the last session, to suspend an old law, inflicting penalties on persons who should follow the clothing trade without having duly served an apprenticeship to it. This suspension bill was disapproved of by the apprenticed clothiers, who made great exertions to prevent its being renewed in this session, and presented a petition for that purpose to the House of Commons. Nobody spoke in favour of the petition; the bill passed; and because Mr. Lascelles did not speak against the bill, he has incurred the marked displeasure of some, and those not inconsiderable in number, of the volunteers of Yorkshire, of which country, or rather, "little kingdom," as Mr. Wilberforce called it, he is one of the representatives, his colleague being Mr. Wilberforce himself. The circumstances are thus stated by my correspondent. "The volunteers in most, if not all, of the manufacturing villages in the neighbourhood of Leeds, hung Mr. Lascelles in effigy, dragged him about, and concluded by shooting him! With those very arms that were given them to protect the constitution, did these gallant volunteers, these patriot heroes, violate one of the chief privileges, the freedom of debate. If an armed mob, Sir, be allowed to express their opinion of the propriety or impropriety of a member's conduct, and to shew their disapprobation by shooting him in effigy, we are not far from the eve of a revolution. From shooting in effigy the transition is not great to shooting in person, which was actually threatened in the present case." This scandalous scene is said to have taken place very soon after these volunteers had returned from the performance of "permanent duty!" I do not pledge myself for the truth of this statement: it comes to me in a letter by post; but, I have myself not the least doubt of the truth of it. It behoves the minister (I speak in the singular number because I "do not count noses") to obtain correct information upon this subject; and, if he finds it to be correct, to cause a striking example to be made of the offenders. Let him never forget the words of Dr. Drake: "to me it appears doubtful whether any government can be long secure, where the people are acquainted with the use of arms, and accustomed to resort to them. Every faction will find itself at the head of an army; every disgust will excite commotion, and every commotion become a civil war." We are not yet got to this state yet; God forbid we

ever should; but, of all our dangers, this, I continue to say, this is by far the greatest. And, I am particularly anxious to guard the minister and the country against the consequences of the volunteer system, if *scarcity* like that of 1800 and 1801 should again come upon us. It will be useless for us to wring our hands and tear our hair when the calamity arrives. We ought, or rather the government ought, even at this time, to be devising precautions against the probable consequences of such a state of things. Mr. Wilberforce tells us to rely upon Providence, but Providence bids us make use of the means and the talents which it has bestowed upon us; and if we, through indolence or fear, disobey the command, what have we to expect but the fate of the sluggard and the coward? — Such is the present state of our military means of defence; such the result of the measures which, since the peace of Amiens, government has adopted relative to the army. The object of these remarks, is, by shewing the people their dangers, particularly the danger arising from the want of a sufficient regular army, to induce them to use, every one according to his means, the utmost exertion, wherever they have it in their power, to favour the recruiting of that army. The present project of the minister must be excessively expensive to the country, as well as vexatious and oppressive to individuals; and, after all, I fear, it will prove lamentably inefficient; but, be this as it may, it is our duty strictly to obey the law that has enjoined the execution of that project; and not only to obey the law, but to give it all the aid in our power, and thus, by our loyalty, patriotism, zeal and activity, to make up, as far as we are able, for the negligence, the incapacity or the obstinacy of the ministers.

**MR. LIVINGSTONE.** — The readers of the Register will recollect, that an opportunity was taken to disapprove of the conduct of Mr. Livingstone in the part he took relative to the correspondence of Mr. Drake; and, as was then expected, the most respectable part of his countrymen, those not slavishly devoted to France, have unequivocally joined in this disapprobation, as will appear from the following extracts made from the New York Evening Post of the 28th of May and 1st of June last. These extracts may, too, serve as an answer to a person who, in the Morning Chronicle, took up the defense of Mr. Livingstone some weeks ago. We have here a specimen of the sentiments entertained towards Mr. Livingstone in his native state and city, where, if any where,

most probably, have made a just estimate of his talents and character. That his adulation of Buonaparté should create great disgust in America is no wonder at all; but, the observations made by the American Editor, relative to the conduct and character of the British government, breathe a spirit of justice and of candour which does great honour to the person from whom the observations proceed, and which cannot fail to meet with the applause of every real friend of England and America.—“ Mr. Livingstone’s letter.—It is impossible to refrain from making a few observations on the very singular letter of Mr. Chancellor Livingston to Talleyrand, as published in this evening’s paper. We mean not to advance any sort of palliation for the conduct of Mr. Drake, the British Minister at Munich, allowing it to be correctly stated: but we think an ordinary share of discretion would have prevented the American ambassador, the minister of a neutral nation, from taking the part in this affair he has done. He undertakes to judge between the parties, although he has only heard one side, and to decide that the charge brought against the English minister, of having engaged in a plot to assassinate the First Consul, has been proved upon him. But it appears from Talleyrand’s letter itself, that Mr. Livingston had only seen printed copies of the letters of Mr. Drake; he therefore has not had even the possibility of detecting a forgery, if one has been committed. Perhaps his veneration and uncommon attachment to the First Consul, may have been so great as to render it impossible to entertain a suspicion of this sort, and yet his recollection might, without any very great difficulty, have supplied him with cases shewing the possibility of such a thing at no very great distance of time past. But allowing the papers of Mr. Drake to be genuine, what do they disclose? On this subject it is certainly difficult for us, who have not seen them, to speak with confidence; but we will say, that from the character which we have heard of this gentleman, and from the character of his government, without whose knowledge and approbation he cannot be supposed to have acted, that when those papers shall be laid before the world, they will not be found to contain that unequivocal evidence of the facts charged, which might justify an impartial man in deciding upon the case and publishing his opinion without hesitation. But at any

rate, we have no difficulty in saying that they will not, cannot, warrant Mr. Livingston in the lengths he has gone. That Courts may employ ministers or agents to reside on the borders of an enemy in time of war, that those agents may employ spies to give information of what is going on in the enemy’s country, and in short communicate to them every thing that can be of service, is a practice sanctioned by long usage; but that such agents should engage in a plot to assassinate the first Magistrate *de facto*, whatever or whoever he may be, will not admit of a justification; and therefore we repeat it, we cannot give credit to this charge brought against Mr. Drake by Talleyrand. But whether true or not, Mr. Livingston should have remembered that he represented a nation at peace with England as well as with France, and that propriety, good sense, and the laws of nations, required of him the strictest neutrality. That his letter is not neutral, but is a very wide departure from it, appears not only in the precipitate condemnation pronounced against the English minister, but in a still more explicit and exceptionable manner in the close of his letter.—It is not necessary that we should here enter into the merits of the controversy between France and England: it is sufficient for our present purpose to state, that on the part of the English nation it is said that Buonaparté has entertained the project of universal empire, and that it is in the great cause of mankind that she contends single-handed against his mad and destructive ambition. ‘We think,’ (say they) ‘the situation of England a proud one, contending single-handed, for the liberty of the world against an ambitious usurper, who knows no law but conquest.’ Now although as a nation we cannot know the First Consul to be an usurper, but in our intercourse with him, are warranted by the law of nations, in regarding him, while in possession of power, as being in the lawful liberty to take the other side and congratulate him upon his ‘noble labours in the field and in the cabinet.’ Besides, if Mr. Livingston has any ground for his apprehensions, that by his ‘loss’ the fate of the country may be materially affected, ought not common prudence to have suggested a different language than what he has employed. Suppose what he apprehends should happen, that Buonaparté

should be taken away and the Bourbon line be re-established, in what a situation would America stand, after having thus joined openly to espouse the cause of the present government? — No; in every point of view Mr. Livingston's conduct must be regarded as indiscreet, improper and unwarranted by precedent. For ourselves we see in this business a deep laid snare of policy, into which the American minister has blundered headlong.—We confess we think he would have shewn more diplomatic skill had he, like Mr. Fauchet, 'drawn himself out of the affair by some common place remarks.' Whether 'his actions are to be attributed to the government he represents and his conduct to be identified with it,' is a question we leave to be settled between him and Mr. Jefferson."—In the same print of the 1st of June is the following passage: **Diplomatic Correspondence.**—We now furnish our readers with the letters of some of the other ministers for whom Citizen Talleyrand set his gull trap. They follow this article in their order.—The first, from the ambassador of the Italian Republic is precisely such an one as might have been expected from the representative of a conquered, abject republic, over which the First Consul holds an absolute sway. The other three letters, though from the ministers of sovereigns who by no means stand in an independent or enviable situation in relation to Buonaparté, yet are all of them written with more caution and discretion than that from the ambassador of the United States, who proudly boast of their independence. If we are not extremely mistaken, Mr. Livingston will rue the day when he wrote that letter to Talleyrand."

**IRISH CURRENCY.**—In referring the reader to a very interesting paper upon the currency of Ireland, in the following sheet, page 137, I cannot refrain from declaring my disagreement with the writer, as to the blame which he imputes, in this respect, to the persons composing the administration in that country, to whom, most assuredly, no part of the blame can fairly be attributed. Does he think, that any set of ministers, however well they might "understand the principles of good government," could have prevented the depreciation of the Bank of Ireland paper? If not, how could they have prevented the debasement of the coin? And, if they could not have prevented the

debasement of the coin, how could they have prevented a refusal to take it in exchange for valuable commodities? "The public offices began the refusal." He acknowledges that the shillings were, at last, made of metal no better than pewter; and I am sure he will not pretend, that this sort of coin could have continued much longer to purchase bread. There might, as to some little matter of regulation, have been blame due to the government; but no regulation of theirs could have retarded the event of stoppage of circulation for the space of three days. The degradation of the coin, or rather bits of metal, had gone as far as it could go. It had arrived at its utmost point; and the decrees of Robespierre would not have supported it a week longer. — In like manner I think that, by all the writers upon Irish currency, the Irish bank directors have been handled much too severely. The depreciation of their paper is, by every body, traced as far back as the measure of bank-restriction. It was the minister and the l'arliament of England who proposed and accomplished that measure; and, if any bank directors are blameable, it is the bank directors on this side of the water; those bank directors who first asked for the restriction, and not those who did not ask for it. That men should ask to be restrained from paying their promissory notes when presented was natural enough: no man, especially one who has had notes presented to him that he was unable to pay, can have the conscience to blame them; but, if we do not blame persons of this description in England, it seems very unfair to deal so hard with their brethren of Ireland, and to represent them, as some persons have, as being very little better than swindlers upon a broad scale. I very much doubt, and I should like to be better informed upon the subject, whether the bank company, in either country, does really derive any profit from the restriction, notwithstanding all that has been said about their *large dividends*. I may be mistaken, and I speak with great diffidence upon the subject; but, I have seen nothing to satisfy me, that banking is now a better trade than it was previous to the restriction. There is now nothing solid in it: it is become a game at hazard: and I sincerely believe, that, what is got with one hand is lost with the other. If my conjectures, for they are mere conjectures, have any foundation, men ought to reflect before they promulgate opinions that may, at a time not far distant, chance to be very destructive to the persons against whom those opinions may finally operate. We should be

very cautious how we excite a popular prejudice against any set of men; and I am sure the writers to whom I allude would lament that their labours should have any such tendency.—To ascribe the degradation of the paper to the measure of *bank-restriction*. [It mortifies one so to abuse the use of words, but habit will sanction any thing!] cannot be avoided; but, I do think that I perceive an uncommon, and, to me, an unaccountable, solicitude to avoid any topic that may lead to the cause of that restriction. You hear persons enough say, that the restriction was absolutely necessary at the time; but there they stop, saying not a word about the cause of the necessity. Some people have, indeed, talked about the rate of the exchange being, at that time, so much against England, that, if the bank had not been restrained from paying its notes in specie, all the hard money would have been drained out of the country. But, has the restriction kept the money in the country? And if so where is it? Lord Hawkesbury, to be sure, has lately told us, that there are, and that there must be, about forty millions of guineas now in the kingdom. Can we not bring him before a justice of the peace and make him prove his words? Well; but as to the rate of exchange, that objection to paying in specie continued after the conclusion of the peace, when Mr. Addington, in presenting a bill for a renewal of the restriction law for a short space, for only a few months, and liable to be repealed during the session, told the House of Commons, that the cause of his proposing the renewal was the unfavourable state of the exchange with the continent. The same reason was stated for a further renewal in the next session, till war arrived most opportunely and relieved his hearers from these tantalizing propositions and promises, by affording him a pretext for demanding a confirmation of the suspension till six months after the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace with France. But, what will Mr. Addington, our late financier, say in answer to Mr. Foster, who states, and who proves, and that too in the most satisfactory manner, that the restriction is the cause of the unfavourable exchange, and that the exchange never can be favourable again, till the restriction is taken off, and, of course, till bank notes are, at the will of the holder, convertible into specie?—No: the rate of the exchange was the effect, and not the cause, from the very beginning of the decline of the paper. The progress, traced backwards, I take to be this: the scarcity of coin has been produced by the depreciation

of the paper; the depreciation of the paper by the excess of its quantity; that excess latterly, in a great degree, by the measure of bank restriction; and that measure by the increase of taxes together with the frequency of loans and advances growing out of the connexion between the Exchequer and the bank. If I am wrong in these opinions, I shall thank any body that will take the pains to put me right; but, until I hear something more conclusive than I have yet heard, I must beg leave to enter my protest against any clamour, in however soft accents it may be begun, against the directors of the bank either of England or Ireland, and more especially against the latter.

**INTERNAL STATE OF JAMAICA.**—This subject will be found very ably treated in the succeeding sheet, page 133; and I only wish to observe here, that there will, upon examination, appear to be a perfect agreement, substantially, in all the papers which have been published in the Register, relative to this important colony. In the enumeration of those papers, at the bottom of page 82, I forgot to mention a very valuable one, which will be found in vol. IV, page 589. It is entitled, “Statements and observations “on the sugar-trade between Great Britain “and her Old West India colonies, printed “for the use of the members of the assembly of Jamaica.” This paper should be carefully perused by all those who wish to obtain a competent degree of knowledge upon the subject of the present complaints of the Jamaica planters, whom my correspondent in page 133 describes, and, I believe, truly describes, as being in the very abyss of bankruptcy. The state of this island and its trade must, and that at no very distant day, become a subject of legislative inquiry, or, the remissness of the parliament must be great indeed. It should be recollected, that, with Jamaica, we lose our all in the West Indies; for, it is well known to naval men, that, in the ports of no other island can our fleet rendezvous in time of war, especially for the purpose of re-fitting; and, indeed, on every account, Jamaica is of so much importance, the rest of the islands are with respect to her so much like satellites, that they must follow her fate, be it what it may. The question, therefore, is nothing short of this: shall we, or shall we not, retain any colonies in the West Indies?

**THE STATE OF ST. DOMINGO,** is as wretched, and the deeds committed upon the whites as bloody, as any negro-lover could possibly wish. The fact as stated in the account of the massacre, in page 153, of

the negroes those whom means impr instances, du and 1795. 1 tion is to be monsters in long endure some defenc brisers of Par be made fo any country. Domingo ha such as thos of France, an of justifi atic equally false. mild than th and no mast kind th in th was in both perhaps, of powers, that encouraged a lion in the g bear men, i affecting to l tions of the r of real comp jects seem to of their at bloody-mind marked for the purpose tended for; cords us fre were to be the consequ would ensue use another thousands u would be r always rema amongst the seize upon t oes would d philanth years, ha an that of peans and food. To ould be pe ace clip th it would ma commercial ose up on ou which own scanty e a subje ho, sighin

the negroes drinking the warm blood of those whom they had murdered is by no means improbable. They did it, in many instances, during their massacres of 1794 and 1795. It is pretended, that a justification is to be found for these blood-thirsty monsters in the treatment, which they so long endured from their masters. The same defence was set up for the September-sisers of Paris; and the same defence might be made for revolutionary cut-throats in any country. Indeed, the massacres of St. Domingo have been produced by doctrines such as those which produced the massacres of France, and in both instances the grounds of justification, or of palliation at least, were equally false. No monarchs were ever more mild than those of the House of Bourbon, and no masters were ever more merciful and kind than the planters of St. Domingo: it was in both cases, the excess of lenity, or, perhaps, of indolence, in the governing powers, that first excited and afterwards encouraged and fostered the spirit of rebellion in the governed. And it is a shame to hear men, in this kingdom lamenting, or affecting to lament, the hardships and privations of the negroes, when so many objects of real compassion amongst their fellow subjects seem to attract but a very little share of their attention. The negroes are a bloody-minded race: they are made and marked for servitude and subjection: it is the purpose which they were obviously intended for; and of this fact every day affords us fresh proof. Suppose the islands were to be abandoned. What would be the consequence? Some years of blood would ensue. The negroes would murder one another; the lands would lie fallow; thousands upon thousands of Europeans would be ruined. But, things would not always remain in this state. The strongest amongst the European powers would again seize upon those fertile domains; more negroes would be brought to cultivate them; and philanthropy would, at the end of twenty years, have accomplished no other end than that of causing great ruin amongst Europeans and the spilling of rivers of African blood. To Great-Britain the abandonment would be peculiarly injurious. It would at once clip the wings of her maritime power; it would make a fearful defalcation in her commercial and pecuniary means; it would close up one of those outlets to her population which causes her to live beyond her own scanty limits, and though this might be a subject of joy with those persons, who, sighing, call the West-Indies "the

grave of Great-Britain," it would be a subject of deep regret with every man who is in the smallest degree acquainted with the principles according to which alone we can rightly judge of the causes of the rise and the fall of nations. Much, upon this subject, may be gathered from the wishes of our enemies. Nothing is so near their heart as the destruction of our colonies in the West Indies. They perceive, if we do not, that the consequences would be the reducing these islands to mere dependent states. They know that, confined within ourselves, we cannot long defend our country against them. They desire nothing so much as to plunge our valuable foreign possessions into confusion and bloodshed; and sorry I am to see, that so many persons amongst ourselves are pursuing objects which must inevitably tend to facilitate the consummation of that desire.

#### FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPER.

##### IMPERIAL DECREES.

*Extract of the Minutes of the Secretary of State's Office.—Decree for taking the Oath and the Coronation of the Emperor, and the other Accessory Ceremonies.—Dated Palace of St. Cloud, July 9, 1804.*

NAPOLEON, by the Grace of God and the Constitutions of the Empire, Emperor of the French, having taken the advice of his Privy Council, decrees:—FIRST SECTION.—*The taking of the Oath, and the Coronation.*—Art. 1. The taking of the Oath and the Coronation of the Emperor, shall take place on the 18th Brumaire next, (Nov. 9).—2. A proclamation shall announce this solemnity to the whole Empire, and shall summon those who are to assist at it, as specified in the Senatus Consultum of the 28th of last Floreal, to appear at Paris before the 10th Brumaire.—3. Particular letters shall also be addressed to them on the part of his Majesty.—4. The Public Functionaries who are summoned, shall make known their arrival to the Principal Master of the Ceremonies, who will indicate the place appointed for them at the ceremony.—5. The solemnity of taking the Oath, and the Coronation, will take place in presence of the Empress, the Princes, Princesses, High Dignitaries, and all the Public Functionaries, described by the Senatus Consultum of the 28th Floreal, in the Chapel of the Invalids.

SECOND SECTION.—*Of the Ceremony which will take place in the Champ de Mars.*—6. After the solemnity of the taking the Oath and the Coronation, his Majesty the

Emperor will proceed to the Champ de Mars.—7. The national guards of every department of the Empire, will send to Paris a detachment of 16 men, with colours for each detachment, one half of which shall be fusileers or grenadiers, one-fourth officers, and one-fourth non-commissioned officers.—8. The maritime departments, squadrons, flotillas, and armed vessels of the Empire, shall send 50 detachments of 10 men, with a flag to each detachment.—

9. Every corps of horse, of all the different descriptions throughout the army, shall send a deputation of 16 men, the half of which shall be grenadiers, fusileers, soldiers, dragoons, light horse, one-fourth officers, and one-fourth non-commissioned officers, with the colours, standard, or guidon.—10. The preceding article is applicable to the regiments of marine artillery.—11. The engineers shall send three deputations of 16 men each.—12. The 26 legions of the gens-d'armes shall each send a deputation of 4 men and a guidon.—13. The invalids of the Hotel at Paris, and those of Louvain and Avignon, shall send three deputations, whose composition shall be regulated according to the instruction of the War Minister.—14. All these deputations shall successively take the oath of fidelity and obedience to his Majesty the Emperor.—15. The deputations of the national guards, those of the maritime circles, and such of the corps who have colours, guidons, or standards, shall afterwards receive from his Majesty, for their department or regiments, a pair of colours for each department, a flag for each detachment of marine, and a guidon or standard for each battalion or squadron.—16. The colours of the departments shall remain in the most conspicuous place of the Hotel of the Prefecture, under the guard already settled for the Prefects. They shall never be taken from thence but by an officer named by the Emperor; and shall be unfurled and shewn to the people on all solemn occasions.—17. The flags shall be distributed among the maritime circles, and deposited at the Marine Hotel, under a guard of honour, in the principal place of the Seven Circles in which Antwerp is comprised, in order to be given to the squadrons, naval armies, flotillas, or other armaments and expeditions, according to the orders of the Emperor.—On their return, these flags shall be carried to the Marine Hotel, where they shall be

kept in the Council Chamber, for some succeeding expedition.—18. The colours, standards, and guidons of the corps, shall be returned to each battalion or squadron. Those who, by the events of war, shall lose them, shall not receive others of the same kind, but by a direct order from his Majesty, after it has been proved that they were not lost by any fault of the regiment. Those who shall lose them from their own fault, shall not receive any others from the Emperor.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

#### SCOTCH SMALL-BOUNTY MEN.

SIR,—Amid the variety of crude and imperfect projects which have been hitherto submitted to the attention of Parliament, it is pleasing to discern, in the abolition of the ballot, something like an approximation to a more rational plan of acting. Whether, indeed, we consider the balloting system on its own merits, or whether we view it with a reference to the other parts of our defence, whether we consider it theoretically or practically, we shall find that it is totally inadequate to its object, and most vexatiously oppressive; in short, that it combines all possible evil with as little good as the nature of things will allow. The army of reserve, to which it gave birth, is a measure which it would be difficult to describe in adequate terms of reprobation. It certainly did astonish the generality of thinking men, that a bill should pass the House of Commons, which imposed a *direct tax* chiefly on that class of the community who ought to be exempted from all *direct taxation*, and to be touched upon very lightly by any sort of impost. This ill-contrived project did, however, meet with the support of Mr. Pitt, who seems not till very lately to have opened his eyes to the flagrant injustice and ruinous effects of the balloting system. Surely he might have known, had he been at any pains to explore those sources of information which are open to all mankind, that the army of reserve is composed chiefly of substitutes, and it did not certainly require very deep thought to discover, that a bill, by which the burden of defending the country was chiefly thrown upon the poor, was partial and unjust. All the information on which his new bill is grounded, and which has induced him to change his former sentiments, he might certainly have obtained at a much earlier period; and, it is peculiarly hard, that though

the pernicious effects of bad measures, are felt and acknowledged by all, yet they must continue in force until it shall please our statesmen to awaken from their dreams. In order, therefore, to anticipate the slow progress of Mr. Pitt's experience, by which he seems disposed ultimately to profit, however slowly it operates on his mind, I shall trouble you with a few observations on a regulation respecting the volunteers, which seems to have derived its origin from his influence, and which appears to me to be both inadequate to its object, expensive to government, and most vexatious to private industry. I allude to that clause in the volunteer act, by which all volunteers, by entering on "permanent duty" for three weeks, are entitled to a bounty of one guinea besides their pay, and the same allowances to their wives and children as are made to those of the militia. You pointed out the inconveniences of this measure when it was first proposed. But those inconveniences are infinitely aggravated in those parts of the country where the rate of wages is low. In Scotland, where the weekly rate of wages is from nine to ten shillings, and where by volunteering for three weeks, men may gain from sixteen to twenty-five shillings per week, the temptation is irresistible. Accordingly, in several parts of this country this measure has been executed with unmitigated rigour. The volunteers of Dundee, Fife, Montrose, and Arbroath have been respectively interchanged. They were ordered to march with only the previous warning of three days, and so strictly was their order enforced, that no exceptions were granted even in cases of the most peculiar and pressing necessity. Every species of industry was most completely at a stand; even in manufactures of perishable commodities, the same severity overbore all considerations of private loss. The shortness of the warning rendered it quite impossible to ward off the blow by any expedient, or even in the smallest degree to alleviate the evil; if a longer time had been allowed, the exertions of private ingenuity might have devised some palliative; persons concerned might have been enabled to make proper arrangements with a view to the expected event, and when it did take place, to have managed the wretched remains of their industry with the best possible effect. But conducted as this plan has been, it is peculiarly calculated to bring ruin upon individuals. The positive loss to individuals in towns which I have mentioned, cannot be estimated at less than £5000, a heavy sum, even if it had been raised by a general impartial assessment, but beyond all

comparison more weighty, when, to the partiality with which it presses upon a particular class of individuals, is added all the variety of mischief, all the random destruction which must result from the execution of this inconsiderate project. We are told that this eventful crisis calls for heavy sacrifices, and renders it necessary to impose heavy burdens. But, I would be glad to know how we are to bear heavy burdens if we are deprived of the means of subsistence, and certainly if this experiment be frequently repeated, it will tend more effectually than the heaviest taxes to ruin the pecuniary resources of the country, and to dry up the very source of revenue. Surely the advantages resulting from this plan ought to have been demonstrated in a very satisfactory manner before it had been adopted. But, so far from thinking that any benefit can be derived from it, in any respect equal to the evil with which it is attended, I do not even think that it is worth the bounty and permanent pay allowed by government. There are, in the first place, to be deducted from the 21 days, three Sundays on which the troops are not drilled; two to march to their respective stations, and two to return; allow for rainy weather four days, in all, eleven days to be deducted from the twenty-one, which leaves a remainder of ten days. Allowing, therefore, the perfection of military discipline to consist in that mechanical precision, in which the volunteers are chiefly instructed, if they are allowed to remain at home, and drilled in the same manner as at the places to which they are marched; if they perform the same evolutions, and bestow the same attention, I cannot help thinking that the same effects will result; with this difference, that in the one case, in the intervals between drilling, and in bad weather, they might employ themselves in their ordinary occupations; whereas, in the other, they loiter about in idleness, and are liable to be corrupted by all those vices of which idleness is a powerful predisposing cause. But if, as you observe, and I think you perfectly correct, the essence of the military character consists in a rooted habit of obedience to command, and not in a punctilious attention to contemptible minutiae, the scheme of permanent duty is of all others the most puerile and ridiculous. To create dispositions and to fix habits in mankind requires a long and laborious process; it is indeed, the nature of all moral habitudes, even after the seminal principles have been strewed in the mind, to grow to maturity by very slow degrees; they require the most patient attention, and they must be fostered

by a variety of collateral causes. In this view, a scrupulous regard to all the minutiae of discipline, though despicable to the last degree in the military mimicry of the volunteers, promotes in the economy of the regular army a very important end; it brings the man constantly under the eye of his officer; it renders him perpetually conversant with authority, WHICH ADMITS OF NO DISPUTE; by these means the artificial principles, cherished in his mind, preponderate at last over those on which they were originally engrafted, and the man is gradually tutored to that degree of instinctive obedience, which constitutes the radical distinction between undisciplined and veteran troops. In our present establishment of internal defence, we have brought together all the constituent elements, but we want the cementing principle to give them coherence and solidity. We have realised the fable of Prometheus. We have formed and combined all the different members of the body according to the rules of just proportion; we have constructed a piece of correct mechanism, and given to it all the external graces of which mere matter is susceptible; but we still want the principle of life, to warm and animate the senseless image; we want a soul to inform the lifeless clay. It is evident that the very fundamental principles on which the volunteers are constituted, are completely hostile to the establishment of strict discipline. How can any thing like a system of vigorous discipline be established among men who have the unqualified power of resigning, and thus at once, on a moment's notice, and for reasons wholly arbitrary, of dissolving all connexion between them and their officers, and of absolving themselves from all the obligations of military duty, whenever they shall prove in the least degree burdensome or disagreeable. In whatever view, therefore, the military character be considered, whether as depending on the attainment of a mechanical precision in certain motions, or whether its essential principles lie deeper in the human mind, the project of three weeks' service appears to be altogether nugatory. In the one case the volunteers may evidently be drilled with more advantage at home, and in the other, surely nothing can be more wild and visionary than to imagine, that under the control of feeble and imperfect discipline, and with inexperienced officers, such a short period of duty can stamp a different character on the relation between them and their officers. Such an expectation can only arise from a blind and obstinate attachment to this incongruous system. Reasoning, therefore, on the principles of the projectors of

the measure, it appears to be potent only to oppress and destroy, but totally inefficient to any good purpose. Its present effects, in the loss of productive industry, and in the havoc made in all the most important relations of civil society, are destructive in the extreme; but, the evil of its remoter operation may not be less fatal in many respects, one of which is, in creating among the great body of the people a disinclination to a service comparatively so poorly rewarded as that of the regular army. All our plans of defence are too much adapted to extreme cases; they are rather the result of rashness and terror, than of deliberate wisdom. Our ministers (and nobody seems to be more actuated by this spirit than Mr. Pitt) seem to think, that in providing for our security, no sacrifice can possibly be too great, that the utter derangement of industry ought not to weigh a feather in the scale of their deliberations, nor even ought to be stated as any objection to the execution of their military projects. They appear to be scared far beyond the bounds of sobriety and reason by the terror of invasion, and if we were to judge by their idle declamation, we should naturally conclude that there was a destroying enemy already in the heart of the country. With them measures of caution have no limit, they pursue them in opposition to every other consideration. Their conduct is somewhat similar to that of a gentleman, whose reigning disturbance was a dread of housebreakers, and who was for nine years unceasingly occupied in improving upon the common methods of security against their attacks. "He had at last, by the daily superaddition of new expedients, contrived a door which could never be forced; for one bar was secured by another with such intricacy of subordination, that he was himself not always able to disengage them in their proper method. He was happy in this fortification, till being asked how he would escape if threatened by fire, he discovered that with all his care and expense he had only been assisting his own destruction. Although it must be confessed that our apprehensions are founded on more solid grounds than the fears of this visionary, yet many of our plans appear to have been conceived in the same spirit of irrational terror, and if we persist in obstinately adhering to our present system, in rendering the national defence an adequate apology for every destructive project; if we continue to squander away the resources of the nation in tempting the labouring classes of society from their natural occupations, we shall undoubtedly find, that in protecting ourselves against all

evil, we have laid ourselves open to another; and that, while we have been vainly endeavouring to heap security upon security, and to guard against the remotest possibility of danger from foreign attack, we have been, by our ignorant and precipitate counsels, if not materially assisting in our own destruction, at least inflicting a wound upon our country, which it will require many years of prosperous tranquillity to heal. The story which I have alluded, applies also, to us in this respect, that the object of all our endeavours, the great purpose for which all our laborious machinery is erected, is the attainment of *mere safety*. All our instruments of defence, like bolts and bars, are in their own nature totally inert, and capable only of negative operation. We possess indeed, resources within ourselves, both physical and moral; which, if they had been consolidated under the direction of a vigorous and comprehensive mind, might have been rendered formidable; but which are "by their very essence and constitution, disabled from defending us by any one preventive stroke, or any operation of active hostility." They are indeed, imprisoned and pent up in our island, and are only fit to be exhibited by Mr. Pitt in a harmless array of figures, for the purpose of dazzling our enemies by a splendid picture of our internal power. When the ardent feelings of patriotism begin to languish under this system of feeble and mismanagement, when a free people hitherto accustomed to identify their existence with their glory, feel their proud spirit broken, and their pride humbled, by being taught to lurk for safety in the dirt mire of a base and cowardly policy, ministers dress up the spectre of invasion, send it abroad to keep the people in awe, and by thus acting on their fears, to dominate their drooping energies, and to procure, for a time, that enthusiasm which results from the prospect of immediate peril. They have muzzled the British lion, and led him in a cage; they have broken his spirit, and nearly extinguished that generous ardour which nature kindled in his heart, now they clatter round his cage, and beat him with a stick, and practise all the low tricks of itinerant jugglers, to make him growl and grin, and to draw forth the noble animal the faint radiations of former fire. B.

## INTERNAL STATE OF JAMAICA.

—After reading in the Register of the instant, (p. 1.) the observations on Jamaica, which are for the most part drawn from the facts of public statements, I offer

you, for any purpose you may think them useful, the following more particularly referring to the internal condition of that colony. As an eye witness I may claim credibility; and when it is recollect that evils such as you have represented do exist, it must be inferred that remote as well as immediate causes have arisen to complete their calamity. The consequences of the high duties on colonial produce, as proved in your Register to have commenced some years back, were a destruction of credit to the planters both here and in Jamaica. Bills of exchange were sent back innumerable, there succeeded between merchants and planters a distressing course of suits at law, the one to protract the loss or independence of their estates, the other to force immediate payment, or to obtain greater security for their unpaid debts. From this the island has progressively been sinking under the blow, the major part of the estates are in the possession of mortgagees, or of the proprietors on sufferance of creditors. Chancery suits are still impending and still renewing; and it may be asserted, that a few years more will reduce Jamaica to a state of beggary. But, the merchants creditors of estates delay the last exertion of law which may transfer the possession and fee simple to themselves, because, even at the reduced price, at which the estates would be forced into their hands, the merchants conceive they would lose, or be injured. So that, while the estates are in the permissive possession of planters, or held by merchants as trustees or mortgagees in possession, or as chancery receivers, there is, strictly speaking, no sound proprietor. Another effect results, that the merchant has what is termed the factorage of the estates, and freight for his ships; he has the consignment of the sugar; he takes to himself compound interest for his debt, and has the whole power of possession without the inconvenience. Government receives the duties, the insurer his quota, and, perhaps, out of the wreck of the fee-simple, the planter, or his devisee, may enjoy an annuity. The estates in Jamaica remains in the *statu quo* of debt: in many instances in annual accumulation: so that, for the greater part, it may be said, that no clear rental goes into any one's pocket; but that it is well if the estate in the action and reaction of necessary charges, and of annual profits to pay them, does not suffer defalcation in the account current. In the political situation of Jamaica, the cause that ruined the planter deters the merchant from wishing to take the property in his own name. The war

has again begun, new taxes are laid on plantation imports; the deterioration of West-India property will be aggravated; and, it may be added, that St. Domingo is a malignant cloud, the fore-runner of civil hurricanes. Tenfold then will be the conviction of the insecurity of West-India possessions. As if the mischief here stated were not enough, the slave abolition is again introduced, and, between the pledges the ministry has made of his humanity, and his consciousness of the result of abolition on the trade and revenue, he will be pushed to contrive expedients of compromise. It must not be presumed that there are no independent proprietors of Jamaica: there are many, not of successful speculations of late years, but of times previous to the date you affix to the origin of Jamaica's bad fortune. Yet they are at a loss to secure their estates from submitting to the debtor side; and feel, in the comparative diminution of means in this country, the diminution of the value of their lands and effects. Even many of them have of late years been chained to the oars of mortgaging. Besides the severity of ministry in laying such duties, another wound to the interest of the planter is the high rate of freight, which is imposed on account of the enormous expense of sailing merchant ships. The Navigation Act, as you observe, is now another grievance, for North America is the life and soul of Jamaica. Sugar is to be shipped there only in British bottoms, which the American government takes care to burden with charges of entry to almost a prohibition. Rum and molasses are allowed to be carried by the Americans. So far from rum being an article of advantage, I have heard that New York spirits have been smuggled to Jamaica for the sake of the profit arising. Jamaica was raised on the foundation of what is termed the forced trade: that is a contraband intercourse allowed by the government with the West-India Spaniards. This is a subject of commercial lamentation: this trade, that once filled Port Royal of earthquake memory, with gold and silver, that raised Kingston to affluence, and diffused plenty over the face of the country, is tottering towards ruin, and the benefit of the Spaniards. Instead of millions of coin, they now bring only thousands, and supply the planter with cattle, mules, and horses, for which instead of taking British goods, they demand much of their own doubloons and dollars back; going to cheaper markets for such commodities. So far from the complaints alluded to in your Register being exaggerated, if these asseverations are bottomed, woe unto Cromwell's

Island! and, that they are truth, the events now existing may imply, and the preceding events of a few years will lay bare. Why Sir, the whole colony is in a state of hostility in the courts of law and chancery, the collectors of taxes are compelled to exert the cruelty of law to enforce payment of taxes; and the resident land owners of small estates are most of them confined to their dwelling houses in a state of siege against the writs of creditors, who again are hunted by the agents of merchants in England for non-payment of loans. And this is the *el dorado* of ministers! the elysium of five thousand of her warriors! What infatuation, what wilful blindness! "*quos Dei vult perdere, prius delirat!*" It cannot have been attempted to look into the state of the colony before proposing such measures. The despair of hungry sharks drove one side to extort, the despair of death drove the other to refuse. From what precedent will the black regiment inflicted on the colony? From the arming of blacks in St. Domingo by the contending whites and mulattoes which, more than the proclamation of the convention, produced the Dessalines of to-day? Was it the arming of the seapox? But where is the parallel between the slaves and the East-Indians, in any one quality or respect whatever? Great oversights are never committed with impunity. Without something in place of prevention (the moment for which is past) Jamaica is in the agonies of death, as to national ability.

*Crescit indulgens sibi dirus hydrops  
Nec sitim pellit nisi causa morbi  
Fugerit venas et aquorūs albo.  
Corpore languor.*

Many more local observations might be urged to substantiate the opinion of Jamaica's decline. Nothing would better answer the purpose, than if a table of the proceedings of an estate were arithmetically laid before the public; both in relation to Jamaica, and to England. Not merely a delineation of charges in gross, but with a specific account of the debts of an estate, accidental relations, and its necessary payments in Jamaica, which would be a proper appendage to the statement, inserted in former Register. The amount of the debts with which Jamaica is loaded commercially should be known by ministers; and the circumstances of the contraband trade should be examined. Even with all due diligence I fear the day of happy reformation is gone. I think it impossible, that existing evils can be amended. So open to the consequences of war, the enormous private debts, increasing public debts, destruction of internal com-

and agitation of credit with English merchants; the change in the Spanish trade, the costs of shipping, the power of the Navigation Act, and the neighbourhood of St. Domingo, together with the condition of the sugar market in England, and the imposition of duty: add to all this the slave trade now in discussion, by the passing of which through the Commons we plead guilty to a self-created verdict of public and private infamy against the prescription of ages; but whatever branch of trade or intercourse we turn, in which Jamaica bears a part, we find not one that is not leathless in its own decay, or stript by the fury of its own dragoon, its pretended guardian! So much for Jamaica. Perhaps our military contractor or sergeant and parish-officer may hope to foment the latent fire of war in our breasts, and tell us to be great within the European islands. Be it so. Without Scotland or Ireland, Bacon, I believe it is, holds up little England as, in itself, the champion of belligerent nations. Yet it might have been thought of, some few years back, to have put a stop to the immense drain of British blood, especially British gold on Jamaica in investments, of purchases and loans, now irreconcileable.—C.

## STATE OF IRISH CURRENCY.

SIR,—The unfeigned thanks of every man are due to you, Mr. Cobbeit, for your liberal and zealous attention to every circumstance connected with their interests. It is only necessary to know, that there is not an Editor of any newspaper published in Ireland, who dares, or, who will, at least, state facts as they occur, or express the sentiments of any correspondent; it is only necessary to know this, in order to be able fully to appreciate the value of your weekly publication, which is now read throughout the greater kingdom. Your insertions on the subject of Irish currency have been of the greatest service, and as an opportunity has offered to me of witnessing in person the effects which have attended the debasement of silver currency, I shall endeavour to give you a clear idea of the causes which produced it, and of the effects which have resulted from it; and notwithstanding Mr. Cobbeit declared in the House of Commons, that measures were resorted to by the Irish government, which had remedied the evil, I trust, be able to prove, that no remedy has yet been applied.—The ratio of silver according to the regulation of mint is as 1 to  $15\frac{3}{5}$ : the true proportion according to the market prices, is as 1 to  $14\frac{1}{2}$ . Twenty-one mint shil-

lings will, therefore, be worth a mint guinea and one shilling, as is perfectly evident by the fact of a pound troy of standard gold being coined into  $44\frac{1}{2}$  guineas, and a pound troy of silver into 62 shillings (Lord King, 2d Edit. p. 138). It follows, therefore, that, when guineas were in circulation in Ireland, there must have been an existing temptation to melt all mint shillings, or those which were any thing heavier than what was necessary to give to 21 shillings more value than the value of a guinea. This circumstance being established, and also the certainty of a depreciation of Bank paper of at least 10 per cent., twenty one shillings of such a weight as would have been left in circulation, when guineas were current, would now be increased in value 10 per centum; or, in other words, they would buy a guinea Bank note and about  $\frac{2}{15}$  of a note. The depreciation, therefore, of paper has been the real cause of the debasement of the silver coin, and the progress of it has regularly coincided with the progress of the depreciation, until no such thing remained in circulation as a real silver representative of a shilling. It is not a matter of surprise, that the silver coin should have been thus permitted by the government of Ireland to die without the benefit of a doctor, when, in the first instance, they so coolly observed the whole currency depreciated 10 per cent. and have so sagaciously discovered, that the malady is past recovery, and that there was no need of a doctor to prescribe to such hale and thrifty characters as those who preside over the measures of the Bank. The government acting upon that principle of physic, which dictates the leaving of nature to herself, have left the guarantee of the value of the currency to the laudable nature of a body of merchants to consult their own interests in preference to that of the public, and the existence of silver specie to the natural propensity of coiners to make more profit by the melting pot, than these ingenious persons were enabled to make by sending back into circulation whatever portion of it they received by walking in the paths of honest industry. For what did the government of Ireland do, when at least two years ago every one began to complain of the silver coin? They did nothing: they left every thing to nature. They even forgot the control they possessed over the receipts at the public offices, and in the collection of the taxes, the receipts of this base coin was permitted at the public offices.—After the work of debasement had been completed, and shillings actually had been passable made of pewter, the public

offices were the first to refuse payment in the base coin, and by this refusal produced the sudden stoppage of all trading operations throughout the whole city of Dublin! The distress which arose from this cause admits not of adequate description. The poor women who had brought their eggs or fowls to market from the vicinity of the metropolis, and who depended upon the usual demand for them for the means of purchasing the bread which was to feed their families for the ensuing day or two, were obliged to return with their commodities which could command no value, and without bread. The roads leading from the markets were, in the evening, crowded with wretched creatures, loudly deplored their misfortunes, and unable to calculate upon any certain method of giving sustenance to their craving children. The inhabitants of Dublin could not be supplied with bread and meat, because the baker and the butchers could not receive in payment what the flour factors and graziers would not receive from them, and thus the people were deprived of the power of procuring the necessities of life, in the midst of plenty and abundance. But these were not the only grievances which were experienced. The time which has since elapsed, and the experience that has since been derived, were necessary to be able to attain a due knowledge of the baneful effects resulting from the debasement of silver coin. The industrious journeyman or labourer, who had received his week's wages, instead of 12s. or 16s. or 21s. which he had fairly earned, was obliged to seek some value for them from those persons, who undertook to give the fair value for the portion of silver contained in each bad shilling; and thus many of the persons who had in the first instance derived a profit by making them, derived a second profit by buying them up and giving to the ignorant and suffering indigent 2d. 3d. or 4d. for that shilling which represented many hours of hard labour.—This was not all, for notwithstanding a certain small quantity of good shillings have come forth into circulation, which had been hoarded up, and some paper notes are issued, and some dollars, and even an efficient remedy applied, according to Mr. Corry, there has not been, and there is not one-fourth part of the amount of the circulation necessary for Dublin, with all these quackeries, yet acquired. The consequence is, that almost all retail trade is at a stand. Though all want to buy, and many want to sell, little or nothing is either bought or sold. The retail traders will, many of them, necessarily be-

come bankrupts. The loss of their demand will necessarily occasion bankruptcies amongst the wholesale merchants; and in this manner general failure, discontent, and ruin may attend the mild administration of Lord Hardwicke.—So much for the effects of a deficient circulation of silver in Dublin. Let us now look to the interior of the country. The outcry against bad silver spread as fast throughout the whole of it as the intelligence of what had happened in Dublin could be communicated, and every poor man lost, in one moment, to a amount exactly in proportion to the degree of industry with which he had laboured to collect the scanty recompence of days of severe toil. Not knowing what to do with pieces of metal that no one would take payment, it was not uncommon to see them throwing them away, tacitly venting their indignation against the government. But as silver notes were in general circulation throughout the interior, and the dealing and payments are more of a wholesale nature, the want of sufficient circulation was not so materially felt as in Dublin; we can not, however, consider this circumstance as a cause of much satisfaction, when we look forward to the operation of the imminent augmented issues of paper, which must necessarily take place throughout all Ireland. Though they will not in the first instant produce any bad effect, if they only meet the net demand for circulation, yet it is probable that the bankers will take advantage of the state of things, and contrive to issue much more than will be really wanting; thus advance prices, and create a demand for that portion of their paper, which would be excessive, and returned back to them.—It is most earnestly to be hoped now that a change in administration has taken place, that the state of Ireland may become an object of the assiduous attention of the new minister; that men may be employed who thoroughly understand the principles of good government, or who, at least, have some qualifications for directing the affairs of so important a portion of the empire.—I am, Sir, &c. &c. J. T.

#### LETTER FROM SIR R. MUSGRAVE.

SIR,—As the veracity of my history of the Irish Rebellion was impeached in your Political Register of May the 12th, by an anonymous writer, under the signature of Verax, I request you will publish the following observations in its defence. The materials for that history were collected with the greatest assiduity, the most scrupulous inquiry and discrimination, and

strictest regard to truth; and, as it was written for the purpose of giving the British Cabinet and Parliament, at present, and posterity hereafter, an accurate narration of the late rebellion, and a fair representation of the state of Ireland many years previous to that dreadful event. Three editions of that work, consisting of no less than 3850 copies have been circulated in England, Ireland, and Scotland; and anxious for the establishment of truth, I made the following appeal in the preface of each: “Though the author has made truth his polar star in the course of this work, it is possible that some errors might have occurred in it, he hopes, therefore, that if the reader should discover any such, he will be kind enough to communicate them to him, and he will amend them in the next edition.” I hope the public will consider the following declaration a full and sufficient answer to the persons who have impeached it: “That no person whatsoever has succeeded in invalidating the authenticity of my history in any one occurrence related in it; and, I defy any person to do so.” On the contrary, I have received the most flattering assurances from the officers who commanded in the late rebellion, that the military transactions have been faithfully described; and I have had the same testimony from the civil magistrates, and from those who were competent to decide upon the events; and, to them I appeal again. As the few feeble attempts which have been made to question my veracity in some trifling points, I have written an answer, which has been published by John Stockdale, Piccadilly. I am still open to conviction, and should any person come forward, to prove to me coolly and dispassionately that I have committed any one error, I will immediately acknowledge and correct it.—A writer states, that, “the Marquis Cornwallis ordered me to leave out the dedication to him, which I had taken the liberty to usher the work into the world with.” I had his Lordship’s permission to dedicate it to him, and he very kindly gave me permission to examine such papers and documents relative to the rebellion as were in the possession of government; but Lordship did not in the most distant manner insinuate, that any part of my history was unfounded. It is much to be lamented, that the mildness of his government, and the strong proofs of his merciful disposition, which the Irish rebels expected, did not in the smallest degree abate their disaffection, or assuage their ferocity; on the landing of one thousand French

at Killaloe, in the county of Sligo, the multitude in two counties rose and joined them; and the inhabitants of two provinces were on the tiptoe of insurrection. Some parts of the province of Leinster, particularly the county of Kildare, were dreadfully disturbed in the year 1799, and barbarous outrages, disgraceful to human nature, were perpetrated in them. That year another rebellion was organised in the province of Munster, and was on the point of exploding. It is well known that the Earl of Hardwicke has used unabated exertions to conciliate the Irish, and to attach them to the state; but neither those, nor his well known beneficent virtues, could prevent the insurrection which took place on the 23d of July, 1803. Is it right that the real cause of those treasonable fermentations in Ireland should be made known to the British government? I believe, and I sincerely lament, that they are radically ignorant of it; but can it be otherwise, when certain persons, whom I avoid naming, are constantly making assertions on this subject, tending to mislead? I am convinced that no loyal person will censure the motives which led me to write a history of the rebellion.—I am, Sir, your obedient servant, RICHARD MUSGRAVE. Dated, Dublin, 17th July, 1804.

#### ON THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE.

SIR,—When the learning, science, and spirit of research of this age are considered, we might naturally expect to find every point of theory on the subject of general government, and every point of practice on particular constitutions settled and established. In our own country, especially, it could not be unreasonable to expect an universal agreement and consent with respect to all great and leading constitutional doctrines. Yet, strange as it may appear, it does so happen, that, in this country, where the learning, science, and spirit of research are pushed as far as perseverance, ability, and talent can push them; where, too, they have been especially directed to this particular object, many of the first and material principles of the constitution remain matter of doubt, dispute and controversy. The point to which I wish now to direct the public attention, is, the right of the crown to nominate and appoint the ministers. That the right itself exists, no one denies; but the limits of that right are, by different persons, placed at such different points, that scarcely less controversy is occasioned than if the right itself were positively denied. On the one hand we find it argued, that, as the crown has the

unlimited right of selecting such ministers as it thinks fit, it is consequently bound to consult no will but its own, and is entitled to expect, on the part of the parliament and of the country, an immediate and entire acquiescence in its choice : on the other hand it is argued, with no less zeal, and I dare say with equal sincerity, that the crown, though it has the right, is bound to consult the inclinations and the wishes of the parliament in the use and exercise of it ; and to select and appoint such persons only, as the parliament confides in, and of whom it entertains a favourable opinion. In conformity with these doctrines, we see, that while, on the one hand, some persons assert and lay it down as the rule of their conduct, that they support ministers because they are ministers, because they are the persons selected by the crown ; so, on the other hand, we find others resisting ministers so chosen, not because they are unfit, not because they have acted improperly and unconstitutionally, but because they are not persons whom they would have advised his Majesty to select, in whom they place their confidence, and who are their favourites. Now, I confess, I think these two doctrines both equally foreign from the real spirit of the constitution, and from the true principles of sound sense. As I conceive, these errors arise from a confusion of the *legal rights* with the *moral duties* of the crown and of the parliament respectively ; and it appears to me that this confusion has been the natural result of the circumstances of the last hundred years. During that period, unlike any former ages of our history, this country has enjoyed a degree of internal happiness and tranquillity unexampled in the history of the world. The principles of the constitution being settled and ascertained at the revolution ; the sceptre having, from that time, been invariably held by monarchs, whose sole object seems to have been to consult the wishes, to promote the happiness, and to forward the independence of the people, we have fondly imagined, that, as no violent and open attacks were made upon it, so time itself, whose progress is marked on the very front and forehead of every other fabric, institution, and being, whether of the physical or the moral world, would leave this alone sacred and unimpaired. But this has not been the case. Perhaps at some other period I may attempt to describe the devastation it has made, to trace the furrows which this ruthless enemy has made on its fair face ; to point out the cracks and settlements in order that you might see that it may, while yet

there be time, be induced to strengthen the decayed parts of this venerable fabric. Suffice it at present to remark, that periods of tranquillity and quiet, such as I have described the last century to have seen, while they are most favourable to the comforts of a people, are likewise often most dangerous to their *rights* ; especially in a country like this, where the rights of every class depend, not on the agreement of interests in the different parties, but on their opposition to each other ; not on their union and close connexion, but on the maintenance of a balance between them : where the entire rights of sovereignty are enjoyed not by one party alone, nor by all together ; but where they are divided and parcelled out to different orders and different classes ; whence it follows that what is acquired by one is lost to the other. Quiet and ease lull that jealousy and constant watchfulness, which are necessary to keep up the opposition and to turn the balance ; and as this spirit, when pushed too far, may lead to revolution, and thereby open violence, to subvert all order ; when from any cause it sinks too low, leaves it to the more active and constant workings of the executive government to less violent, but yet more certain means, to destroy the equilibrium and to establish something not unlike despotic sway. When it appears, that, though times of tumult and disturbance are to be dreaded and avoided, yet that, if liberty is valuable, it must be purchased at a certain rate, at the price of that perfect complacency of ease and tranquillity, which a well-regulated despotism or an absolute tyranny under a perfect tyrant (I mean perfect, not in point of power only, but in point of virtue, justice, merit and power ; a thing inconsistent with human nature) is alone capable of producing — I will now concisely state what I conceive to be the real principles of the constitution on the subject of the appointment of ministers ; adding, perhaps, one or two reasons on which that opinion is founded ; and noticing the advantages attendant on the adoption of those principles.—1. I should assert that, legally speaking, the right of the crown to choose its own ministers is a clear, unlimited, entire right to select whom it will without any reference to the wishes, affections, or partialities of any other person whatsoever. So of the parliament I should say, that it has a right no less clear, express and unlimited to approve or disapprove, to confide in or to refuse confidence to, the ministers whom the crown should appoint.—2. Morally speaking, I should say, that the crown is bound in honour and in conscience



making its choice to select, not those whom favouritism or partiality might point out, but those whose talents are such as may give an assurance, that its affairs can safely be trusted to their hands, whose truth is such, as naturally entitles them to the privilege of approaching near to, and conversing familiarly with the royal person; and whose character is such that the parliament and the country cannot justly refuse to repose confidence in them. On the other hand I should assert, that the parliament is bound in conscience and in honour, *prima facie*, to suppose the ministers selected by the crown fit and proper persons, merely because they are selected; such selection being in itself an honour and a dignity conferred by the person, who really and constitutionally has the right to confer it, and is consequently bound to support such ministers, not only when they perform some act which merits such support, but also to support them as a matter of course, till they do some act to forfeit that confidence, or bring forward some measure that is unwise or objectionable.—

1. Politically speaking; that is, speaking for the good and convenience of all parties, I should say, that the crown is bound (perhaps to say is bound, is too strong a word)—that the crown, acting prudently, would always select for its ministers, not merely those with whom the parliament is acquainted, but those whom it is likely to approve and to support; and on the other hand, that in no case is the parliament justified in withholding confidence from persons merely because they are ministers, or, in other words, to act upon that absurd, and (I hope) obsolete cry of a perpetual jealousy of, and opposition to ministers.—These being the principles on which I conceive that it is right for the crown on the one hand, and for the parliament on the other, to act in such cases. I proceed now to give my reasons for that opinion. As to the legal right of the crown to nominate the ministers, it is, I believe, undisputed on all hands; if it were not so, I need only here appeal to the fact; for we all know that, in fact, its *ipse dixit* is and must be sufficient. As to the moral duty which in exercising this right it has to perform, I shall merely say, that in every department of every state, I might say, in every situation of life, where a legal right is vested, a correspondent moral duty exists. The king has a right to choose his ministers; his correspondent moral duty is to choose a fit one. A man has a right to turn away his servant, he is bound in morality not to do so unjustly. A man has a right to torture his beast, he is morally bound to have mercy on it and not

to torment it. And lastly, on the point of convenience no one, I presume, will deny, that the convenience of all parties would be consulted by selecting a person agreeable to all parties, rather than by selecting one agreeable to one party and displeasing to all the rest.—So much as to the rights and duties of the crown; now for those of the parliament. The right to refuse confidence to ministers is proved by the power to do so: and who will deny the power of the parliament to say *no* to any proposition submitted to it? But here again there exists the correspondent moral duty not to say *no* vexatiously or captiously, but only on a fair and honest conviction of the unfitness of the *aye*. It is not a sufficient reason for opposing a minister that his complexion is disagreeable, or “the cut of his beard” displeasing; there must be a real, honest dislike to the measure proposed, not to the man proposing. And here let me digress for a moment to allude to that doctrine, which some months ago was a good deal canvassed; I mean the doctrine of “measures and not men.” To me the solution is easy and evident. When confidence is claimed, then you must look to the men; you must consider their character and their talents; for the confidence you are to repose, is in the men, not in the measures, of which by the very call for confidence you are supposed to know nothing. On the other hand, when a measure is brought forward, then you are to canvass the measure, and not the character of the men, for the measure is the same whoever brings it forward. Even in this case, however, some attention, it may be thought, ought to be paid to the men to whom the execution is to be entrusted. I confess I think not; for the execution is a matter which affects not the original measure, which is entrusted to ministers on their responsibility, and which may be scrutinized afterwards. But to return.—I come now to the third part of my subject, viz. the advantages resulting from the rights and duties of the crown and parliament respectively, being on the footing above stated. These I conceive to be no less than the preservation of the rights of the people on the one hand, and the dignity and independence of the crown on the other. If, as it is asserted by some, the very fact of a minister being the choice of the crown is sufficient title to the confidence and constant support of the parliament; then the controlling power of parliament is a nullity; its deliberations a farce; and the government of the country a pure and absolute despotism. If, on the other hand, the crown has no

right of selection, but is bound to follow the caprices of the parliament, we are laid open to all the dangers and disorders of a popular government. In the one case, the crown would be the slave of the parliament; in the other, the parliament would be the slave of the crown. But if the rights and duties of these two bodies respectively be as I have stated, then I think they are both sufficiently independent of each other, at the same time that the people have ample security that their liberties will not be attacked; for while the crown is thus unfettered in its choice, it is still ultimately, as it ought to be, under the control of parliament, whose confidence is necessary to the support of the government; so that though it may be able to resist and oppose the short sallies of popular prejudice, it can never stand against the continued exertions of an opposition, arising from the experience of its imbecillity, wickedness, or folly. And this I conceive to be the real advantage of the British constitution; that while it makes the measures of government depend on the real opinions and wishes of the people, it is not liable to be disturbed or interrupted by the sudden and occasional sallies to which they are subject. For it is to be remarked, that while nothing is so subject to hasty, headstrong, and erroneous opinions as a popular assembly, yet that the confirmed, sedate, and deliberate opinion of the same assembly is wise, correct, and just. And in this sense it is, and in this sense only, that "*vox populi est vox Dei.*" — Connected with this subject is a doctrine on which I will now say a word or two. We have at times in this country heard a great deal of "secret advisers." By "secret advisers" I believe is meant persons unknown and irresponsible, who are supposed to possess the royal ear, to enjoy the royal confidence, and to influence the royal actions. Lord A. Hamilton, in his lately published pamphlet, very truly observes, that secret advisers are unknown to the constitution. They are unknown to the constitution most indubitably; they are also, I should believe, imaginary beings in point of fact. At best, of this I am sure, that if the minister be a man of common honesty, common prudence, and common spirit, such persons cannot exist. Every action of the government must be performed by some person; whose regular official duty it is to do it, and for which he is responsible. The king can do no wrong; he is not responsible for any thing; but he can do nothing of himself. His every order must pass through the official channel, must be countersigned by the proper officer,

or is of no force whatsoever. This being the case, I ask whether any man possessed of the common feelings of self-love, or of confidence in his own integrity and talents, will bear to be responsible for acts which he does not advise and which he does not approve. If his vanity would permit this degradation, surely his prudence could not suffer him to run the hazard? I say, which he does not approve, for if he do approve of them, it is much the same as if they were suggested by himself. But after all, to the constitution these secret advisers are in no ways interesting. It is really of no consequence whether they exist or not. The minister is undeniably responsible for every act of his official administration, and every act of the crown (save one) must be the act of the official administration of some one or other. If a minister chooses to be responsible for acts not originating with him, and not approved of by him, that is solely, his affair; to the country and to the parliament it is a matter of total indifference. All that is material to them is, to have some one, to whom responsibility attaches, and whom they may punish, if they think fit. The official minister is that person; indisputably he is so; and for him to allege, when called to account, that the measure did not originate with him, would diminish nought of his responsibility, and would expose his meanness and his folly; but there is an act, I say, which is purely and entirely the King's own; for which no minister is responsible. Secret advisers may be had recourse to in that case. Granted; but what does that signify? The objection to secret advisers is, that they are irresponsible ministers; true, but if in this case, the King has recourse to no adviser; to his own opinion alone; does there attach any responsibility? Most assuredly not. No responsibility is then lost; and as it is the loss of responsibility, that injures the country, no injury is then sustained. Now what is this act to which I allude? It is the act of appointing the confidential servants of the Crown; and for that act, the appointing them, I say, no responsibility attaches anywhere. How so? The King can do no wrong; because he is irresponsible. Who has the legal right to appoint the ministers? Who but the King. He may, therefore, select whom he pleases, and no responsibility will attach anywhere. Is this denied? Then, I ask, where the responsibility does attach? To those who advise.—True. But who is to advise? If there is a necessity for advice; there must exist somewhere an obligation to advise? Otherwise, there would be advice without an

wiser, which is absurd. Where then does this obligation lie? Is it in the minister, whose removal occasions the vacancy? That cannot be; for, in the first place, the vacancy may be occasioned by his death, and then he could not advise; or, secondly, his removal may by him be thought unjust and unmerited; and he may know of no one qualified in his opinion to fill the situation but himself.—Must he then recommend himself? That would be absurd.—Must he recommend some one whom he thinks less fit? That would be dishonest.—Is such a feeling impossible? Is it unnatural? It may be foolish, it may be full of vanity; but it is neither inconsistent with honesty or with probability. It appears, then, it is not the business of the old minister to recommend his successor.—Is it the business of the new one? That is impossible; for, it would imply that he acted before he existed, which is absurd.—Is it then, the act of the King himself, for which, he of course is irresponsible, and for which, no one can be responsible, because it is no one's act but his? I answer, yes;—and he who denies this proposition, he it is who establishes of necessity the existence of secret advisers. Thus, then, I maintain, the appointing a minister is an act of the King's own, for which no one is responsible. But it will be said, the King may then appoint the most unfit and incapable person to be his minister. He certainly may; but, besides that, the parliament have the power, the right, and have it as a duty, to resist and prevent the first proof of unfitness and incapacity; besides that; I say, that the person so appointed is highly responsible for accepting the offer, for suffering himself to be appointed. When the King offered the seals of the Exchequer to the Doctor, was he responsible? No; but the Doctor was amply responsible to the country for accepting them, without abilities to perform the duties of the office.—When the King presented the same keys to Mr. Pitt, avowing at the same time the principle of exclusion, was he responsible then? Equally not; but Mr. Pitt was amply responsible for accepting office on the principle of exclusion at a time, when he professed himself, as it was evident to all, that the country stood in need of the co-operation of *all* the talents, *all* the influence, *all* the strength, which *all* parties and *all* public men united could bring together. Thus then, even in this case, the country is secure of responsibility somewhere in point of fact, though perhaps not in point of theory. The king is not responsible for the act he performs, but the minister ap-

pointed is responsible for suffering himself to be acted upon. The responsibility attaches itself to the patient, the agent being exempt.

—There are one or two further observations, which I wish to make on the doctrines above maintained; and which I have thrown into a note, not to interrupt the mere theoretical argument of the text.—These further observations, point to the principle, that there is one act namely, the act of appointing ministers, which is really the act of the King himself, and not of any minister; and for which, of course, no man is responsible. This principle, I think, may possibly be denied by some people *in toto*; and by others to a certain degree. I conceive these latter persons, will say “true;” “if no minister whatever exists, if all the old ones are got rid of; if a new administration is to be formed altogether, then I grant, that the act must come immediately and directly from the King; but, if some one member of the old ministry continues, then he becomes responsible for advising the King to appoint the person selected to fill up the vacancy.” I admit, there is some plausibility in this statement, especially in the case, when the head of the administration continued in office, and the person changed was merely the chief of some inferior department. But, I deny, that even in this case responsibility attaches any where for the appointment. In the first place, I deny, that the existence of a prime minister, or a head of the ministry is known to the constitution. From the convenience resulting from the fact, and from modern practice, such a person almost always exists; but, I assert, that necessarily and constitutionally, there is no such person. Every department is independent of the other; the Secretary of State for the Home Department, or for the Foreign Affairs, is as independent of the chief of every other department, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer or First Lord of the Treasury. I know no reason constitutionally for the existence of a Cabinet. I know some very good constitutional reasons against it. Thus I assert, that in theory it is possible, that the principal officer of each department of the state, may not only be totally independent of every other, but at open hostility with him. Whether affairs could easily or conveniently be managed in such a case, is a totally different question. I am talking here theoretically and constitutionally. But each of these officers is appointed directly by the King himself, who may or may not, as he pleases, consult his other ministers or his “secret advisers” on the appointment. We have no

right or interest to inquire whether the appointment be of his own making or not. Each case resolves itself directly into the case mentioned before. But, it will be said, "how far is this to extend, for if you assert that the appointment to offices rests solely with the King, then he can appoint to every office, and will thus really himself manage every department?" To this objection, I answer, that I imagine in point of fact, that the appointment of inferior officers in each department, necessarily comes through the chief of that department. I do not actually know the fact, but I presume this to be the case; viz. that the appointment of an inferior officer to be valid, must be countersigned by the chief of the department to which that officer belongs; and then that chief becomes directly and evidently responsible for the appointment. But, even if this is not the case, if the King can of his own motion appoint the inferior officers, yet the responsibility can with great facility be traced directly to the chief of each department. Each such chief is responsible for every act done by every subordinate agent in that department. What? When he does not appoint these subordinate agents? Yes, truly; for though he does not appoint them, he is able to retire from his situation, if he cannot confide in those placed under him. He may withdraw himself from the responsibility by withdrawing from the place; or he may keep them both; they cannot be separated. My butler is answerable to me for the care of my plate; do I then leave it to him to choose the servant, who, under him, cleans and watches it? No; I choose that servant myself; and, if I choose a man in whom the butler does not confide, and on his representation do not like to part with him, the butler in common prudence withdraws from my service and the responsibility at once.—With respect to "secret advisers" as they are called; the doctrine concerning them I dislike in another view. For without being pushed by any means to extremes, it goes to prevent the man, whom chance has placed upon the throne, from having any thing like a private friend; and to deprive him of one of the greatest of human blessings. It goes to prevent him from holding familiar converse with either his queen, or his son, on public matters; for they would be equally, with any others, secret irresponsible advisers. This would be a cruelty not to be endured; it is a private persecution which, I think too well of the constitution, to believe it subjects any man to. But if my doctrine is true, then I say this difficulty is entirely got

rid of; and as much security and responsibility exists, as in any case can be wished for.—I have written upon this subject, much more than I intended when I first began. I believe I have stated the doctrines which I have alluded to correctly; and, I now send the result of my opinions to you, Mr. Cobbett, for insertion in your paper, if you think fit. If any person is inclined to controvert my doctrine, and to argue the point with me, I shall be very glad to see his arguments, and am really open to conviction if I am wrong. But, I beg to reserve to myself the right of replying, whether the answer be published in your paper, or sent to me privately. If they are published in any other paper, it is possible I may not see them. You will be kind enough to keep by you, to be called for, any letters directed to Censor, No. 15, Duke Street, Westminster; to which address, I beg all letters controverting my doctrine, and not meant for insertion, to be sent.—CENSOR.

#### THE KING NEVER DIES.

SIR,—Your learned correspondents of the Inns of Court have given you many extracts from Doddridge and others of great force and authority, which prove indisputably, that, if the King is ill, the Parliament ought to ascertain the state he may be in, clearly, and in a way to satisfy the country, and not to trust only to the reports of a secret committee of ministers and physicians. I beg leave to call your attention to an event which occurs in our history, (vide Hume), and which seems to me not unworthy of your notice. In 1454, Henry the Sixth fell into a distemper, which rendered him incapable of maintaining even the appearance of royalty. The Queen and Council appointed the Duke of York Lieutenant of the Kingdom, with powers to open and hold a session of Parliament. That assembly also taking into consideration the state of the Kingdom created him protector during pleasure. In 1456, Margaret produced her husband before the House of Lords, and he was re-instated in his sovereign authority. It does not appear, Sir, that when the King fell ill there was any delay in appointing a regent. The constitution suffers no suspension of the executive power; no pause, no interval in the government. Blackstone uses these words, "a third attribute of the King's Majesty is, PERPETUITY; the law ascribes to him in his political capacity an absolute immortality; the King never dies. Henry, Edward, or George may die, but the King survives them all." It is to this power, which cannot legally lie

dormant for ever, that every power attached to the crown in this country, who take their only inclination to private interests, &c. &c. &c.—

MASSACRE OF ST. BARTHOLOMEW'S DAY.

The following extract from the New York Journal, which follows, received the intelligence of the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day, commenced in the middle of August, received and immediately hundred persons, indiscriminately massacred the same time in Possess. It which they plan has been matured.—In and of them were had been inhabitants boats were in every vessel short time thirty passed which had g. St. Thomas immediately since between fell under tions, and men from murderers, Dessa nation, justif French, and wards, wh Domingo, m, or sha ty thous em, and all hold Toussai lves; bu oclamat the Islan 1804; J

moment for a moment, to this constitutional king, that every loyal Englishman ought to be attached : but it seems, Sir, that there are in this country men (and among those too, who talk loudly of prerogative) who are only inclined to support the monarchical power, while the person, that suits their private interest is invested with it.—I am, Sir, &c. &c.—O. B.

## MASSACRE IN SAINT DOMINGO.

The following statement is taken from the New York papers of the 4th of June last. The Proclamations of Dessalines, which follow, but too fully establish the correctness of the statement.—“ We have received the melancholy intelligence of the massacre of all the white French inhabitants of St. Domingo. This bloody work commenced in Port-au-Prince about the middle of May. An account of it was soon received and published at the Cape, and immediately after about five and twenty hundred persons, men, women, and children, indiscriminately, were deliberately massacred there. It was general about the same time in every place which the blacks possess. It is evident, from the care with which they selected their victims, that the plan has been long formed, and deliberately matured.—None but French have suffered, and of them hardly one has escaped. Every care had been taken to prevent the white inhabitants from leaving the island ; row boats were employed to board and examine every vessel going out of the harbour. A short time before the massacre took place thirty passengers were found in a schooner, which had got out of the harbour, bound to St. Thomas, and, with the crew, they were immediately put to death. At Port-au-Prince between five or six hundred persons fell under the bloody hatchet of the Haytians, and the warm stream of blood which ran from them, quenched the thirst of their murderers, who went on their knees to receive it. Dessalines has published a proclamation, justifying the extermination of the French, and offering fifteen days to the Spaniards, who occupy the eastern part of St. Domingo, to determine either to submit to him, or share the fate of the French ; he has fifty thousand men ready to march against them, and is determined that no European shall hold an office of power on the island. ‘ Toussaint,’ says he, ‘ did his work by halves ; but I will complete it.’ ”

*Proclamation by Dessalines, as Gov. Gen. of the Island, dated at the Cape, April 28, 1804 ; first Year of Independence.*

Crimes, the most atrocious, such as were until then unheard of, and would cause nature to shudder, have been perpetrated. The measure was overheated. At length the hour of vengeance has arrived, and the implacable enemies of the rights of man have suffered the punishment due to their crimes.—My arm, raised over their heads, has too long delayed to strike. At that signal, which the justice of God has urged, your hands, righteously armed, have brought the axe upon the ancient tree of slavery and prejudices. In vain had time, and more especially the infernal politics of Europeans, surrounded it with triple brass ; you have stripped it of its armour ; you have placed it upon your heart, that you may become (like your natural enemies) cruel and merciless. Like an overflowing mighty torrent, that tears down all opposition, your vengeful fury has carried away every thing in its impetuous course. Thus perish all tyrants over innocence, all oppressors of mankind ! —What then ? Bent for many ages under an iron yoke : the sport of the passions of men, or their injustice, and of the caprices of fortune ; mutilated victims of the cupidity of white Frenchmen ; after having fattened with our toils these insatiate blood suckers, with a patience and resignation unexampled, we should again have seen that sacrilegious horde make an attempt upon our destruction, without any distinction of sex or age ; and we, men without energy, of no virtue, of no delicate sensibility, should not we have plunged in their breast the dagger of desperation ? Where is that vile Haytian, so unworthy of his regeneration, who thinks he has not accomplished the decrees of the Eternal, by exterminating these blood-thirsty tygers ? If there be one, let him fly ; indignant nature discards him from our bosom ; let him hide his shame far from hence : the air we breathe is not suited to his gross organs ; it is the pure air of liberty, august and triumphant.—Yes, we have rendered to these true cannibals war for war, crime for crime, outrage for outrage : yes, I have saved my country ; I have avenged America. The avowal I make of it, in the face of earth and heaven, constitutes my pride and my glory. Of what consequence to me is the opinion which contemporary and future generations will pronounce upon my conduct ? I have performed my duty ; I enjoy my own approbation ; for me that is sufficient. But what do I say ? The preservation of my unfortunate brothers, the testimony of my own conscience, are not my only recompence : I have seen two

classes of men; born to cherish, assist, and succour one another—mixed in a world, and blended together—crying for vengeance, and disputing the honour of the first blow.—Blacks and yellows, whom the refined duplicity of Europeans has for a long time endeavoured to divide; you, who are now consolidated, and make but one family; without doubt it was necessary that our perfect reconciliation should be sealed with the blood of your butchers. Similar calamities have hung over your proscribed heads: a similar ardour to strike your enemies has signalled you: the like fate is reserved for you: and the like interests must therefore render you for ever one, indivisible and inseparable. Maintain that precious concord, that happy harmony amongst yourselves: it is the pledge of your happiness, your salvation, and your success: it is the secret of being invincible.—Is it necessary, in order to strengthen these ties, to recall to your remembrance the catalogue of atrocities committed against our species; the massacre of the entire population of this island, meditated in the silence and *sang-froid* of the cabinet; the execution of that abominable project, to me unblushingly proposed, and already begun by the French, with the calmness and serenity of a countenance accustomed to similar crimes. Guadeloupe, pillaged and destroyed; its ruins still reeking with the blood of the children, women, and old men put to the sword; Pelage (himself the victim of their craftiness), after having basely betrayed his country and his brothers; the brave and immortal Delgresse, blown into the air with the fort which he defended, rather than accept their offered chains. Magnanimous warrior! that noble death, far from enfeebling our courage, serves only to rouse within us the determination of avenging or of following thee. Shall I again recall to your memory the plots lately framed at Jeremie? the terrible explosion which was to be the result, notwithstanding the generous pardon granted to these incorrigible beings at the expulsion of the French army? The deplorable fate of our departed brothers in Europe? and (dread harbinger of death) the frightful despotism exercised at Martinique? Unfortunate people of Martinique, could I but fly to your assistance, and break your fetters! Alas! an insurmountable barrier separates us. Perhaps a spark from the same fire which enflames us, will alight into your bosoms: perhaps, at the sound of this commotion, suddenly awakened from your lethargy, with arms in your hands, you will reclaim your sacred and imprescriptible rights.—After the ter-

rible example which I have just given, that, sooner or later, Divine Justice will unchain on earth some mighty minds, above the weakness of the vulgar, for the destruction and terror of the wicked; tremble, tyrants, usurpers, scourges of the new world! our daggers are sharpened; your punishment is ready! sixty thousand men, equipped, hurried to war, obedient to my orders, burn to offer a new sacrifice to the names of their assassinated brothers. Let that nation come, who may be mad and daring enough to attack me. Already at its approach, the irritated genius of Hayti, arising out of the bosom of the ocean, appears; his menacing aspect throws the waves into commotion, excites tempests, and with his mighty hand disperses ships, or dashes them in pieces; to his formidable voice the laws of nature pay obedience; diseases, plague, famine, conflagration, poison, are his constant attendants. But why calculate on the assistance of the climate and of the elements? Have I forgot that I commanded a people of no common cast, brought up in adversity, whose audacious daring trows at obstacles and increases by dangers? Let them come, then, these homicidal cohorts! I wait for them with firmness and with a steady eye. I abandon to them freely the sea shore, and the places where cities have existed; but woe to those who may approach too near the mountains! It were better for them that the sea received them into its profound abyss, than to be devoured by the anger of the children of Hayti.—“War to death to tyrants!” this is my motto; “liberty! independence!” this is our rallying cry.—Generals, officers, soldiers, a little unlike him who has preceded me, the ex-general Toussaint Louverture, I have been faithful to the promise which I made to you when I took up arms against tyranny, and whilst the last spark of life remains in me I shall keep my oath—“Never again shall a colonist or an European set his foot upon this territory with the title of master or proprietor.” This resolution shall henceforward form the fundamental basis of our constitution.—Should other chiefs, after me, by pursuing a conduct diametrically opposite to mine, dig their own graves and those of their own species, you will have to accuse only the law of destiny, which shall have taken me away from the happiness and welfare of my fellow citizens. May my successors follow the path I shall have traced out for them! It is the system best adapted for consolidating their power; it is the highest homage they can render to my memory.—As it is derogatory to my charac-

and my dignity to punish the innocent the crimes of the guilty, a handful of ites, commendable by the religion they always professed, and who have besides taken the oath to live with us in the woods, I experienced my clemency. I order that the sword respect them, and that they unmolested.—I recommend anew and ever to all the generals of departments, &c. grant succours, encouragement, and protection to all neutral and friendly nations, so may wish to establish commercial relations in this island.

*Proclamation by Dessalines, dated at the Cape, May 8, 1804; first Year of Independence.*

Scarce had the French army been expelled, when you hastened to acknowledge my authority; by a free and spontaneous movement of your heart, you ranged yourselves under my subjection. More careful of the prosperity than the ruin of that part which you inhabit, I gave to this homage a favourable reception. From that moment have considered you as my children, and my fidelity to you remains undiminished. As a proof of my paternal solicitude, with the places which have submitted to my power, I have proposed for chiefs none but men chosen from amongst yourselves. Jealous of counting you in the rank of my friends, that I might give you all the time necessary for recollection, and that I might assure myself of your fidelity, I have hitherto restrained the burning ardour of my soldiers. Already I congratulated myself on the success of my solicitude, which had for its object to prevent the effusion of blood; but at this time a fanatic priest had kindled in your breasts the rage which predominates therein: the incensed French had not yet instilled into you the poison of falsehood and calumny. Writings, originating in despair and weakness, have been circulated; and immediately some amongst you, seduced by perfidious insinuations, solicited the friendship and protection of the French; they dared to outrage my kindness, by coalescing with my cruel enemies. Spaniards, reflect! On the brink of the precipice which is dug under your feet, will that diabolical minister save you, when with fire and sword I shall have pursued you to your last entrenchments? Ah! without doubt, his prayers, his grimaces, his lies, would be no impediment to my career. Vain as powerless, can he preserve you from my just anger, after I shall have buried him, and the collection of brigands he commands, under the ruins of your capital! Let them both recollect that it is

before my intrepid phalanxes that all the resources and the skill of Europeans have proved ineffectual: and that into my victorious bonds the destiny of the captain-general Rochambeau has been surrendered. To lure the Spaniards to their party, they propagate the report that vessels laden with troops have arrived at Santo Domingo. Why is it not the truth? They little imagine that, in delaying to attack them until this time, my principal object has been to suffer them to increase the mass of our resources, and the number of our victims. To spread distrust and terror, they incessantly dwell upon the fate which the French have just experienced: but have I had reason to treat them so? The wrongs of the French, do they appertain to Spaniards? and must I visit on the latter the crimes which the former have conceived, ordered, and executed upon our species? They have the effrontery to say, that, reduced to seek safety in flight, I am gone to conceal my defeat in the southern part of the island. Well then! Let them learn that I am ready; that the thunderbolt is going to fall on their heads. Let them know that my soldiers are impatiently waiting for the signal to go and re-conquer the boundaries which nature and the elements have assigned to us. A few moments more, and I shall crush the remnant of the French under the weight of mighty power. Spaniards! you, to whom I address myself, solely because I wish to save you; you who, for having been guilty of evasion, shall speedily preserve your existence only so far as my clemency may deign to spare you; it is yet time; abjure an error which may be fatal to you; and break off all connections with my enemy, if you wish your blood may not be confounded with his. Name to me, without delay, that part of your territory on which my first blow is to be struck, or inform me whether I must strike on all points without discrimination. I give you fifteen days, from the date of this notification, to forward your last intentions, and to rally under my banners. You are not ignorant that all the roads of St. Domingo in every direction are familiar to us; that more than once we have seen your dispersed bands fly before us. In a word, you know what I can do, and what I dare; think of your preservation. Receive here the sacred promise which I make, not to do any thing against your personal safety or your interest, if you seize upon this occasion to shew yourselves worthy of being admitted amongst the children of Hayti.

*Remarks of the American Editor.—In consequence of the first of these proclamations,*

an indiscriminate massacre of the whites commenced, on the 19th of April, and continued till the 14th of May. Letters, as well as the verbal accounts of the passengers agree in representing it as being horrible beyond description. On the 14th of May, when the informant left the Cape, the infuriated negroes had sacrificed to their unrelenting policy not less than 2500 human beings. The work of destruction then ceased from necessity, for no more victims remained.—The details we have received of these transactions are shocking to the ear. Indeed, no language of which we are capable, can describe with accuracy the horrors of the carnage, which had no respect to the infirmity of age, or the innocence of childhood; but involved in one common ruin, and frequently with the same sword, the infant sucking at the breast, and the unoffending mother from whom it derived its nourishment.—On the last mentioned day, Dessalines left the Cape by way of Port-de-Paix and Gonaives, for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the second proclamation, which he had caused to be issued in that part of the Island of St. Domingo inhabited by the Spaniards. He also ordered that the occupiers of houses should remove, with all possible speed, to a ditch at the side of the mountain, the dead bodies of the murdered which remained in the streets, that they might not be either devoured by the dogs, or be suffered to produce a pestilence.—The quantity of silver plate, jewellery, gold articles, &c. plundered from the dead, and brought in by the negroes, was immense, and frequently offered for sale, at half its value.—On the 22d April, Fort Dauphin was pillaged, a part of the town destroyed, and the whites massacred to the number of from 85 to 90.—A few days afterwards, the French inhabitants of St. Jago, and other parts of the interior, were escorted to the Cape, under a strong guard, and there butchered.

#### PUBLIC PAPERS.

*Convention concluded between his Majesty the Emperor of the French and the reigning Count of Bentheim Steinfurth. Dated Paris, May 12, 1804; and signed by C. M. TALLEYRAND and LOUIS, reigning Count of Bentheim.*

*Art. 1st.—His Excellency the reigning Count of Bentheim shall, with all the proper and customary forms usual in Germany, be put in possession of the county of Bentheim.*

[160] them immediately on paying into the Hanoverian treasury the sum of 800,000 livres, which, without the deductions, which the French Government resigns, is the original sum for which the county was pledged.—Art. 2d.—The French Government guarantees to the Count Bentheim Steinfurth the maintenance and full force of this Convention, whatever may be the future fate of the Hanoverian territory.

*Ratification.*—His Majesty, the Emperor, approves and ratifies the above Convention, which was signed and ratified on the 22d of Floreal, of the year 12, by Charles Maurice Talleyrand, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, provided with full powers for that purpose, and Count Louis, reigning Count of Bentheim.—Given at St. Cloud, the 2d Prairial (22d May).—(Signed)—NAPOLEON.

*Note lately delivered to the Dict of Ratisbon, by the King of Great-Britain's Electoral Envoy, BARON VON REDIN, relative to the County of Bentheim.*

His Britannic Majesty and Electoral Highness of Brunswick Lunenburgh, having learned that the Count of Bentheim Steinfurth, has in the course of the preceding summer, attempted to avail himself of the unexampled invasion by the French, of the territory belonging to the German Empire, and appertaining to his Britannic Majesty, as Elector of Brunswick and Lunenburgh, in order, unjustly, to appropriate to himself the County of Bentheim, which, as is well known, is possessed by his Majesty as a security. Not being able to succeed in the attempt, Count Bentheim Steinfurth, according to every appearance, is now engaged in a negotiation with the French Government, to obtain for himself, in the most shameless and unjust manner, the above-mentioned security, which was made with the full consent and concurrence of the House of Bentheim Steinfurth, and the validity of which was never disputed by the present Count.—His Britannic Majesty might have left this injurious transaction to its own nullity and invalidity; but he has rather chosen explicitly to declare, as he has already publicly made known his determination with respect to all loans of money, that he will not acknowledge any negotiations or treaties that may be entered into without his consent, relative to the County of Bentheim, but will assert his just claims and rights against the Count of Bentheim Steinfurth.